CAPEC-481: Contradictory Destinations in Traffic Routing Schemes
Description
Extended Description
Signature verification algorithms are generally used to determine whether a certificate or piece of code (e.g. executable, binary, etc.) possesses a valid signature and can be trusted.
If the leveraged algorithm confirms that a valid signature exists, it establishes a foundation of trust that is further conveyed to the end-user when interacting with a website or application. However, if the signature verification algorithm improperly validates the signature, either by not validating the signature at all or by failing to fully validate the signature, it could result in an adversary generating a spoofed signature and being classified as a legitimate entity. Successfully exploiting such a weakness could further allow the adversary to reroute users to malicious sites, steals files, activates microphones, records keystrokes and passwords, wipes disks, installs malware, and more.
Severity :
High
Possibility :
Medium
Type :
Standard
Relationships with other CAPECs
This table shows the other attack patterns and high level categories that are related to this attack pattern.
Prerequisites
This table shows the other attack patterns and high level categories that are related to this attack pattern.
- An adversary must be aware that their message will be routed using a CDN, and that both of the contradictory domains are served from that CDN.
- If the purpose of the Domain Fronting is to hide redirected C2 traffic, the C2 server must have been created in the CDN.
Skills required
This table shows the other attack patterns and high level categories that are related to this attack pattern.
- Medium The adversary must have some knowledge of how messages are routed.
Taxonomy mappings
Mappings to ATT&CK, OWASP and other frameworks.
Related CWE
A Related Weakness relationship associates a weakness with this attack pattern. Each association implies a weakness that must exist for a given attack to be successful.
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