CWE-243: Creation of chroot Jail Without Changing Working Directory
Description
The product uses the chroot() system call to create a jail, but does not change the working directory afterward. This does not prevent access to files outside of the jail.
Submission Date :
July 19, 2006, midnight
Modification Date :
2023-06-29 00:00:00+00:00
Organization :
MITRE
Extended Description
Improper use of chroot() may allow attackers to escape from the chroot jail. The chroot() function call does not change the process's current working directory, so relative paths may still refer to file system resources outside of the chroot jail after chroot() has been called.
Example - 1
Consider the following source code from a (hypothetical) FTP server:
fwrite(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), network);
chroot("/var/ftproot");...fgets(filename, sizeof(filename), network);localfile = fopen(filename, "r");while ((len = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), localfile)) != EOF) {}fclose(localfile);
This code is responsible for reading a filename from the network, opening the corresponding file on the local machine, and sending the contents over the network. This code could be used to implement the FTP GET command. The FTP server calls chroot() in its initialization routines in an attempt to prevent access to files outside of /var/ftproot. But because the server does not change the current working directory by calling chdir("/"), an attacker could request the file "../../../../../etc/passwd" and obtain a copy of the system password file.
Related Weaknesses
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined to give an overview of the different insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction.
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