CVE-2017-9230
Bitcoin Proof-of-Work Algorithm Chain Header Replay Vulnerability
Description
The Bitcoin Proof-of-Work algorithm does not consider a certain attack methodology related to 80-byte block headers with a variety of initial 64-byte chunks followed by the same 16-byte chunk, multiple candidate root values ending with the same 4 bytes, and calculations involving sqrt numbers. This violates the security assumptions of (1) the choice of input, outside of the dedicated nonce area, fed into the Proof-of-Work function should not change its difficulty to evaluate and (2) every Proof-of-Work function execution should be independent. NOTE: a number of persons feel that this methodology is a benign mining optimization, not a vulnerability
INFO
Published Date :
May 24, 2017, 4:29 p.m.
Last Modified :
Aug. 5, 2024, 5:15 p.m.
Source :
[email protected]
Remotely Exploitable :
Yes !
Impact Score :
3.6
Exploitability Score :
3.9
Public PoC/Exploit Available at Github
CVE-2017-9230 has a 1 public PoC/Exploit available at Github.
Go to the Public Exploits tab to see the list.
References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools
Here, you will find a curated list of external links that provide in-depth
information, practical solutions, and valuable tools related to
CVE-2017-9230.
| URL | Resource |
|---|---|
| http://www.mit.edu/~jlrubin//public/pdfs/Asicboost.pdf | Technical Description |
| http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/98657 | Third Party Advisory VDB Entry |
| https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1604/1604.00575.pdf | Technical Description |
| https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-April/013996.html | Mailing List Technical Description Third Party Advisory |
| https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014349.html | Mailing List Third Party Advisory |
| https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014351.html | Mailing List Third Party Advisory |
| https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014352.html | Mailing List Third Party Advisory |
We scan GitHub repositories to detect new proof-of-concept exploits. Following list is a collection of public exploits and proof-of-concepts, which have been published on GitHub (sorted by the most recently updated).
master
C++ HTML M4
Results are limited to the first 15 repositories due to potential performance issues.
The following list is the news that have been mention
CVE-2017-9230 vulnerability anywhere in the article.
The following table lists the changes that have been made to the
CVE-2017-9230 vulnerability over time.
Vulnerability history details can be useful for understanding the evolution of a vulnerability, and for identifying the most recent changes that may impact the vulnerability's severity, exploitability, or other characteristics.
-
CVE Modified by [email protected]
Aug. 05, 2024
Action Type Old Value New Value -
CVE Modified by 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0
Jul. 03, 2024
Action Type Old Value New Value Added CWE CISA-ADP CWE-338 Added CVSS V3.1 CISA-ADP AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N -
CVE Modified by [email protected]
Jun. 04, 2024
Action Type Old Value New Value -
CVE Modified by [email protected]
May. 17, 2024
Action Type Old Value New Value -
CVE Modified by [email protected]
May. 14, 2024
Action Type Old Value New Value -
CVE Modified by [email protected]
Apr. 11, 2024
Action Type Old Value New Value -
CVE Modified by [email protected]
Mar. 21, 2024
Action Type Old Value New Value Added Tag MITRE disputed -
CVE Modified by [email protected]
Nov. 07, 2023
Action Type Old Value New Value Changed Description ** DISPUTED ** The Bitcoin Proof-of-Work algorithm does not consider a certain attack methodology related to 80-byte block headers with a variety of initial 64-byte chunks followed by the same 16-byte chunk, multiple candidate root values ending with the same 4 bytes, and calculations involving sqrt numbers. This violates the security assumptions of (1) the choice of input, outside of the dedicated nonce area, fed into the Proof-of-Work function should not change its difficulty to evaluate and (2) every Proof-of-Work function execution should be independent. NOTE: a number of persons feel that this methodology is a benign mining optimization, not a vulnerability. The Bitcoin Proof-of-Work algorithm does not consider a certain attack methodology related to 80-byte block headers with a variety of initial 64-byte chunks followed by the same 16-byte chunk, multiple candidate root values ending with the same 4 bytes, and calculations involving sqrt numbers. This violates the security assumptions of (1) the choice of input, outside of the dedicated nonce area, fed into the Proof-of-Work function should not change its difficulty to evaluate and (2) every Proof-of-Work function execution should be independent. NOTE: a number of persons feel that this methodology is a benign mining optimization, not a vulnerability -
CVE Modified by [email protected]
Jun. 14, 2018
Action Type Old Value New Value Changed Description The Bitcoin Proof-of-Work algorithm does not consider a certain attack methodology related to 80-byte block headers with a variety of initial 64-byte chunks followed by the same 16-byte chunk, multiple candidate root values ending with the same 4 bytes, and calculations involving sqrt numbers. This violates the security assumptions of (1) the choice of input, outside of the dedicated nonce area, fed into the Proof-of-Work function should not change its difficulty to evaluate and (2) every Proof-of-Work function execution should be independent. NOTE: a number of persons feel that this methodology is a benign mining optimization, not a vulnerability. ** DISPUTED ** The Bitcoin Proof-of-Work algorithm does not consider a certain attack methodology related to 80-byte block headers with a variety of initial 64-byte chunks followed by the same 16-byte chunk, multiple candidate root values ending with the same 4 bytes, and calculations involving sqrt numbers. This violates the security assumptions of (1) the choice of input, outside of the dedicated nonce area, fed into the Proof-of-Work function should not change its difficulty to evaluate and (2) every Proof-of-Work function execution should be independent. NOTE: a number of persons feel that this methodology is a benign mining optimization, not a vulnerability. -
CVE Modified by [email protected]
Jun. 06, 2018
Action Type Old Value New Value Changed Description The Bitcoin Proof-of-Work algorithm does not consider a certain attack methodology related to 80-byte block headers with a variety of initial 64-byte chunks followed by the same 16-byte chunk, multiple candidate root values ending with the same 4 bytes, and calculations involving sqrt numbers. This violates the security assumptions of (1) the choice of input, outside of the dedicated nonce area, fed into the Proof-of-Work function should not change its difficulty to evaluate and (2) every Proof-of-Work function execution should be independent. The Bitcoin Proof-of-Work algorithm does not consider a certain attack methodology related to 80-byte block headers with a variety of initial 64-byte chunks followed by the same 16-byte chunk, multiple candidate root values ending with the same 4 bytes, and calculations involving sqrt numbers. This violates the security assumptions of (1) the choice of input, outside of the dedicated nonce area, fed into the Proof-of-Work function should not change its difficulty to evaluate and (2) every Proof-of-Work function execution should be independent. NOTE: a number of persons feel that this methodology is a benign mining optimization, not a vulnerability. -
Initial Analysis by [email protected]
Jun. 12, 2017
Action Type Old Value New Value Added CVSS V2 (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N) Added CVSS V3 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N Changed Reference Type https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1604/1604.00575.pdf No Types Assigned https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1604/1604.00575.pdf Technical Description Changed Reference Type https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014351.html No Types Assigned https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014351.html Mailing List, Third Party Advisory Changed Reference Type https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014349.html No Types Assigned https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014349.html Mailing List, Third Party Advisory Changed Reference Type http://www.mit.edu/~jlrubin//public/pdfs/Asicboost.pdf No Types Assigned http://www.mit.edu/~jlrubin//public/pdfs/Asicboost.pdf Technical Description Changed Reference Type https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014352.html No Types Assigned https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014352.html Mailing List, Third Party Advisory Changed Reference Type https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-April/013996.html No Types Assigned https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-April/013996.html Mailing List, Technical Description, Third Party Advisory Changed Reference Type http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/98657 No Types Assigned http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/98657 Third Party Advisory, VDB Entry Added CWE CWE-338 Added CPE Configuration OR *cpe:2.3:a:bitcoin:bitcoin:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* -
CVE Modified by [email protected]
May. 27, 2017
Action Type Old Value New Value Added Reference http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/98657 [No Types Assigned]
CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration
While CVE identifies
specific instances of vulnerabilities, CWE categorizes the common flaws or
weaknesses that can lead to vulnerabilities. CVE-2017-9230 is
associated with the following CWEs:
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
(CAPEC)
stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the common attributes and
approaches employed by adversaries to exploit the CVE-2017-9230
weaknesses.
Exploit Prediction
EPSS is a daily estimate of the probability of exploitation activity being observed over the next 30 days.
0.53 }} -0.01%
score
0.73700
percentile