9.8
CRITICAL
CVE-2017-9861
SMA Solar Technology SIP Authentication Bypass
Description

An issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. The SIP implementation does not properly use authentication with encryption: it is vulnerable to replay attacks, packet injection attacks, and man in the middle attacks. An attacker is able to successfully use SIP to communicate with the device from anywhere within the LAN. An attacker may use this to crash the device, stop it from communicating with the SMA servers, exploit known SIP vulnerabilities, or find sensitive information from the SIP communications. Furthermore, because the SIP communication channel is unencrypted, an attacker capable of understanding the protocol can eavesdrop on communications. For example, passwords can be extracted. NOTE: the vendor's position is that authentication with encryption is not required on an isolated subnetwork. Also, only Sunny Boy TLST-21 and TL-21 and Sunny Tripower TL-10 and TL-30 could potentially be affected

INFO

Published Date :

Aug. 5, 2017, 5:29 p.m.

Last Modified :

Aug. 5, 2024, 6:15 p.m.

Remotely Exploitable :

Yes !

Impact Score :

5.9

Exploitability Score :

3.9
Affected Products

The following products are affected by CVE-2017-9861 vulnerability. Even if cvefeed.io is aware of the exact versions of the products that are affected, the information is not represented in the table below.

ID Vendor Product Action
1 Sma sunny_boy_3600_firmware
2 Sma sunny_boy_5000_firmware
3 Sma sunny_tripower_core1_firmware
4 Sma sunny_tripower_15000tl_firmware
5 Sma sunny_tripower_20000tl_firmware
6 Sma sunny_tripower_25000tl_firmware
7 Sma sunny_tripower_5000tl_firmware
8 Sma sunny_tripower_12000tl_firmware
9 Sma sunny_tripower_60_firmware
10 Sma sunny_boy_3000tl_firmware
11 Sma sunny_boy_3600tl_firmware
12 Sma sunny_boy_4000tl_firmware
13 Sma sunny_boy_5000tl_firmware
14 Sma sunny_boy_1.5_firmware
15 Sma sunny_boy_2.5_firmware
16 Sma sunny_boy_3.0_firmware
17 Sma sunny_boy_3.6_firmware
18 Sma sunny_boy_4.0_firmware
19 Sma sunny_boy_5.0_firmware
20 Sma sunny_central_2200_firmware
21 Sma sunny_central_1000cp_xt_firmware
22 Sma sunny_central_800cp_xt_firmware
23 Sma sunny_central_850cp_xt_firmware
24 Sma sunny_central_900cp_xt_firmware
25 Sma sunny_central_500cp_xt_firmware
26 Sma sunny_central_630cp_xt_firmware
27 Sma sunny_central_720cp_xt_firmware
28 Sma sunny_central_760cp_xt_firmware
29 Sma sunny_central_storage_500_firmware
30 Sma sunny_central_storage_630_firmware
31 Sma sunny_central_storage_720_firmware
32 Sma sunny_central_storage_760_firmware
33 Sma sunny_central_storage_800_firmware
34 Sma sunny_central_storage_850_firmware
35 Sma sunny_central_storage_900_firmware
36 Sma sunny_central_storage_1000_firmware
37 Sma sunny_central_storage_2200_firmware
38 Sma sunny_central_storage_2500-ev_firmware
39 Sma sunny_boy_storage_2.5_firmware
40 Sma sunny_boy_3600
41 Sma sunny_boy_5000
42 Sma sunny_tripower_core1
43 Sma sunny_tripower_15000tl
44 Sma sunny_tripower_20000tl
45 Sma sunny_tripower_25000tl
46 Sma sunny_tripower_5000tl
47 Sma sunny_tripower_12000tl
48 Sma sunny_tripower_60
49 Sma sunny_boy_3000tl
50 Sma sunny_boy_3600tl
51 Sma sunny_boy_4000tl
52 Sma sunny_boy_5000tl
53 Sma sunny_boy_1.5
54 Sma sunny_boy_2.5
55 Sma sunny_boy_3.0
56 Sma sunny_boy_3.6
57 Sma sunny_boy_4.0
58 Sma sunny_boy_5.0
59 Sma sunny_central_2200
60 Sma sunny_central_1000cp_xt
61 Sma sunny_central_800cp_xt
62 Sma sunny_central_850cp_xt
63 Sma sunny_central_900cp_xt
64 Sma sunny_central_500cp_xt
65 Sma sunny_central_630cp_xt
66 Sma sunny_central_720cp_xt
67 Sma sunny_central_760cp_xt
68 Sma sunny_central_storage_500
69 Sma sunny_central_storage_630
70 Sma sunny_central_storage_720
71 Sma sunny_central_storage_760
72 Sma sunny_central_storage_800
73 Sma sunny_central_storage_850
74 Sma sunny_central_storage_900
75 Sma sunny_central_storage_1000
76 Sma sunny_central_storage_2200
77 Sma sunny_central_storage_2500-ev
78 Sma sunny_boy_storage_2.5
References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools

Here, you will find a curated list of external links that provide in-depth information, practical solutions, and valuable tools related to CVE-2017-9861.

URL Resource
http://www.sma.de/en/statement-on-cyber-security.html
http://www.sma.de/fileadmin/content/global/specials/documents/cyber-security/Whitepaper-Cyber-Security-AEN1732_07.pdf
https://horusscenario.com/CVE-information/ Third Party Advisory

We scan GitHub repositories to detect new proof-of-concept exploits. Following list is a collection of public exploits and proof-of-concepts, which have been published on GitHub (sorted by the most recently updated).

Results are limited to the first 15 repositories due to potential performance issues.

The following list is the news that have been mention CVE-2017-9861 vulnerability anywhere in the article.

The following table lists the changes that have been made to the CVE-2017-9861 vulnerability over time.

Vulnerability history details can be useful for understanding the evolution of a vulnerability, and for identifying the most recent changes that may impact the vulnerability's severity, exploitability, or other characteristics.

  • CVE Modified by [email protected]

    Aug. 05, 2024

    Action Type Old Value New Value
  • CVE Modified by [email protected]

    Jun. 18, 2024

    Action Type Old Value New Value
  • CVE Modified by [email protected]

    May. 17, 2024

    Action Type Old Value New Value
  • CVE Modified by [email protected]

    May. 14, 2024

    Action Type Old Value New Value
  • CVE Modified by [email protected]

    Apr. 11, 2024

    Action Type Old Value New Value
  • CVE Modified by [email protected]

    Mar. 21, 2024

    Action Type Old Value New Value
    Added Tag MITRE disputed
  • CVE Modified by [email protected]

    Nov. 07, 2023

    Action Type Old Value New Value
    Changed Description ** DISPUTED ** An issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. The SIP implementation does not properly use authentication with encryption: it is vulnerable to replay attacks, packet injection attacks, and man in the middle attacks. An attacker is able to successfully use SIP to communicate with the device from anywhere within the LAN. An attacker may use this to crash the device, stop it from communicating with the SMA servers, exploit known SIP vulnerabilities, or find sensitive information from the SIP communications. Furthermore, because the SIP communication channel is unencrypted, an attacker capable of understanding the protocol can eavesdrop on communications. For example, passwords can be extracted. NOTE: the vendor's position is that authentication with encryption is not required on an isolated subnetwork. Also, only Sunny Boy TLST-21 and TL-21 and Sunny Tripower TL-10 and TL-30 could potentially be affected. An issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. The SIP implementation does not properly use authentication with encryption: it is vulnerable to replay attacks, packet injection attacks, and man in the middle attacks. An attacker is able to successfully use SIP to communicate with the device from anywhere within the LAN. An attacker may use this to crash the device, stop it from communicating with the SMA servers, exploit known SIP vulnerabilities, or find sensitive information from the SIP communications. Furthermore, because the SIP communication channel is unencrypted, an attacker capable of understanding the protocol can eavesdrop on communications. For example, passwords can be extracted. NOTE: the vendor's position is that authentication with encryption is not required on an isolated subnetwork. Also, only Sunny Boy TLST-21 and TL-21 and Sunny Tripower TL-10 and TL-30 could potentially be affected
  • CVE Modified by [email protected]

    Aug. 22, 2017

    Action Type Old Value New Value
    Changed Description An issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. The SIP implementation does not properly use authentication with encryption: it is vulnerable to replay attacks, packet injection attacks, and man in the middle attacks. An attacker is able to successfully use SIP to communicate with the device from anywhere within the LAN. An attacker may use this to crash the device, stop it from communicating with the SMA servers, exploit known SIP vulnerabilities, or find sensitive information from the SIP communications. Furthermore, because the SIP communication channel is unencrypted, an attacker capable of understanding the protocol can eavesdrop on communications. For example, passwords can be extracted. ** DISPUTED ** An issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. The SIP implementation does not properly use authentication with encryption: it is vulnerable to replay attacks, packet injection attacks, and man in the middle attacks. An attacker is able to successfully use SIP to communicate with the device from anywhere within the LAN. An attacker may use this to crash the device, stop it from communicating with the SMA servers, exploit known SIP vulnerabilities, or find sensitive information from the SIP communications. Furthermore, because the SIP communication channel is unencrypted, an attacker capable of understanding the protocol can eavesdrop on communications. For example, passwords can be extracted. NOTE: the vendor's position is that authentication with encryption is not required on an isolated subnetwork. Also, only Sunny Boy TLST-21 and TL-21 and Sunny Tripower TL-10 and TL-30 could potentially be affected.
    Added Reference http://www.sma.de/fileadmin/content/global/specials/documents/cyber-security/Whitepaper-Cyber-Security-AEN1732_07.pdf [No Types Assigned]
    Added Reference http://www.sma.de/en/statement-on-cyber-security.html [No Types Assigned]
  • Initial Analysis by [email protected]

    Aug. 14, 2017

    Action Type Old Value New Value
    Added CVSS V2 (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:C)
    Added CVSS V3 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
    Changed Reference Type https://horusscenario.com/CVE-information/ No Types Assigned https://horusscenario.com/CVE-information/ Third Party Advisory
    Added CWE CWE-74
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_boy_3600_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_boy_3600:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_boy_5000_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_boy_5000:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_tripower_core1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_tripower_core1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_tripower_15000tl_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_tripower_15000tl:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_tripower_20000tl_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_tripower_20000tl:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_tripower_25000tl_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_tripower_25000tl:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_tripower_5000tl_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_tripower_5000tl:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_tripower_12000tl_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_tripower_12000tl:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_tripower_60_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_tripower_60:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_boy_3000tl_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_boy_3000tl:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_boy_3600tl_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_boy_3600tl:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_boy_4000tl_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_boy_4000tl:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_boy_5000tl_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_boy_5000tl:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_boy_1.5_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_boy_1.5:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_boy_2.5_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_boy_2.5:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_boy_3.0_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_boy_3.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_boy_3.6_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_boy_3.6:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_boy_4.0_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_boy_4.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_boy_5.0_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_boy_5.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_central_2200_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_central_2200:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_central_1000cp_xt_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_central_1000cp_xt:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_central_800cp_xt_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_central_800cp_xt:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_central_850cp_xt_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_central_850cp_xt:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_central_900cp_xt_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_central_900cp_xt:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_central_500cp_xt_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_central_500cp_xt:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_central_630cp_xt_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_central_630cp_xt:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_central_720cp_xt_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_central_720cp_xt:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_central_760cp_xt_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_central_760cp_xt:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_central_storage_500_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_central_storage_500:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_central_storage_630_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_central_storage_630:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_central_storage_720_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_central_storage_720:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_central_storage_760_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_central_storage_760:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_central_storage_800_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_central_storage_800:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_central_storage_850_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_central_storage_850:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_central_storage_900_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_central_storage_900:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_central_storage_1000_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_central_storage_1000:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_central_storage_2200_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_central_storage_2200:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_central_storage_2500-ev_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_central_storage_2500-ev:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Added CPE Configuration AND OR *cpe:2.3:o:sma:sunny_boy_storage_2.5_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* OR cpe:2.3:h:sma:sunny_boy_storage_2.5:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
EPSS is a daily estimate of the probability of exploitation activity being observed over the next 30 days. Following chart shows the EPSS score history of the vulnerability.
CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration

While CVE identifies specific instances of vulnerabilities, CWE categorizes the common flaws or weaknesses that can lead to vulnerabilities. CVE-2017-9861 is associated with the following CWEs:

Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)

Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the common attributes and approaches employed by adversaries to exploit the CVE-2017-9861 weaknesses.

CAPEC-3: Using Leading 'Ghost' Character Sequences to Bypass Input Filters Using Leading 'Ghost' Character Sequences to Bypass Input Filters CAPEC-6: Argument Injection Argument Injection CAPEC-7: Blind SQL Injection Blind SQL Injection CAPEC-8: Buffer Overflow in an API Call Buffer Overflow in an API Call CAPEC-9: Buffer Overflow in Local Command-Line Utilities Buffer Overflow in Local Command-Line Utilities CAPEC-10: Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values Subverting Environment Variable Values CAPEC-14: Client-side Injection-induced Buffer Overflow Client-side Injection-induced Buffer Overflow CAPEC-24: Filter Failure through Buffer Overflow Filter Failure through Buffer Overflow CAPEC-28: Fuzzing Fuzzing CAPEC-34: HTTP Response Splitting HTTP Response Splitting CAPEC-42: MIME Conversion MIME Conversion CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers CAPEC-45: Buffer Overflow via Symbolic Links Buffer Overflow via Symbolic Links CAPEC-46: Overflow Variables and Tags Overflow Variables and Tags CAPEC-47: Buffer Overflow via Parameter Expansion Buffer Overflow via Parameter Expansion CAPEC-51: Poison Web Service Registry Poison Web Service Registry CAPEC-52: Embedding NULL Bytes Embedding NULL Bytes CAPEC-53: Postfix, Null Terminate, and Backslash Postfix, Null Terminate, and Backslash CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic CAPEC-67: String Format Overflow in syslog() String Format Overflow in syslog() CAPEC-71: Using Unicode Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic Using Unicode Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic CAPEC-72: URL Encoding URL Encoding CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding CAPEC-80: Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic CAPEC-83: XPath Injection XPath Injection CAPEC-84: XQuery Injection XQuery Injection CAPEC-101: Server Side Include (SSI) Injection Server Side Include (SSI) Injection CAPEC-105: HTTP Request Splitting HTTP Request Splitting CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection Command Line Execution through SQL Injection CAPEC-120: Double Encoding Double Encoding CAPEC-135: Format String Injection Format String Injection CAPEC-250: XML Injection XML Injection CAPEC-267: Leverage Alternate Encoding Leverage Alternate Encoding CAPEC-273: HTTP Response Smuggling HTTP Response Smuggling
Exploit Prediction

EPSS is a daily estimate of the probability of exploitation activity being observed over the next 30 days.

0.14 }} 0.00%

score

0.47393

percentile

CVSS30 - Vulnerability Scoring System
Attack Vector
Attack Complexity
Privileges Required
User Interaction
Scope
Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability