CVE-2020-3442
DuoConnect HTTP Relay Exposition Vulnerability
Description
The DuoConnect client enables users to establish SSH connections to hosts protected by a DNG instance. When a user initiates an SSH connection to a DNG-protected host for the first time using DuoConnect, the user’s browser is opened to a login screen in order to complete authentication determined by the contents of the '-relay' argument. If the ‘-relay’ is set to a URL beginning with "http://", then the browser will initially attempt to load the URL over an insecure HTTP connection, before being immediately redirected to HTTPS (in addition to standard redirect mechanisms, the DNG uses HTTP Strict Transport Security headers to enforce this). After successfully authenticating to a DNG, DuoConnect stores an authentication token in a local system cache, so users do not have to complete this browser-based authentication workflow for every subsequent SSH connection. These tokens are valid for a configurable period of time, which defaults to 8 hours. If a user running DuoConnect already has a valid token, then instead of opening a web browser, DuoConnect directly contacts the DNG, again using the configured '-relay' value, and sends this token, as well as the intended SSH server hostname and port numbers. If the '-relay' argument begins with "http://", then this request will be sent over an insecure connection, and could be exposed to an attacker who is sniffing the traffic on the same network. The DNG authentication tokens that may be exposed during SSH relay may be used to gain network-level access to the servers and ports protected by that given relay host. The DNG provides network-level access only to the protected SSH servers. It does not interact with the independent SSH authentication and encryption. An attacker cannot use a stolen token on its own to authenticate against a DNG-protected SSH server.
INFO
Published Date :
July 20, 2020, 9:15 p.m.
Last Modified :
Nov. 7, 2023, 3:22 a.m.
Source :
[email protected]
Remotely Exploitable :
No
Impact Score :
3.6
Exploitability Score :
2.1
References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools
Here, you will find a curated list of external links that provide in-depth
information, practical solutions, and valuable tools related to
CVE-2020-3442
.
URL | Resource |
---|---|
https://duo.com/labs/psa/duo-psa-2020-003 | Patch Vendor Advisory |
We scan GitHub repositories to detect new proof-of-concept exploits. Following list is a collection of public exploits and proof-of-concepts, which have been published on GitHub (sorted by the most recently updated).
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The following list is the news that have been mention
CVE-2020-3442
vulnerability anywhere in the article.
The following table lists the changes that have been made to the
CVE-2020-3442
vulnerability over time.
Vulnerability history details can be useful for understanding the evolution of a vulnerability, and for identifying the most recent changes that may impact the vulnerability's severity, exploitability, or other characteristics.
-
CVE Modified by [email protected]
May. 14, 2024
Action Type Old Value New Value -
CVE Modified by [email protected]
Nov. 07, 2023
Action Type Old Value New Value Changed Description The DuoConnect client enables users to establish SSH connections to hosts protected by a DNG instance. When a user initiates an SSH connection to a DNG-protected host for the first time using DuoConnect, the user’s browser is opened to a login screen in order to complete authentication determined by the contents of the '-relay' argument. If the ‘-relay’ is set to a URL beginning with "http://", then the browser will initially attempt to load the URL over an insecure HTTP connection, before being immediately redirected to HTTPS (in addition to standard redirect mechanisms, the DNG uses HTTP Strict Transport Security headers to enforce this). After successfully authenticating to a DNG, DuoConnect stores an authentication token in a local system cache, so users do not have to complete this browser-based authentication workflow for every subsequent SSH connection. These tokens are valid for a configurable period of time, which defaults to 8 hours. If a user running DuoConnect already has a valid token, then instead of opening a web browser, DuoConnect directly contacts the DNG, again using the configured '-relay' value, and sends this token, as well as the intended SSH server hostname and port numbers. If the '-relay' argument begins with "http://", then this request will be sent over an insecure connection, and could be exposed to an attacker who is sniffing the traffic on the same network. The DNG authentication tokens that may be exposed during SSH relay may be used to gain network-level access to the servers and ports protected by that given relay host. The DNG provides network-level access only to the protected SSH servers. It does not interact with the independent SSH authentication and encryption. An attacker cannot use a stolen token on its own to authenticate against a DNG-protected SSH server. The DuoConnect client enables users to establish SSH connections to hosts protected by a DNG instance. When a user initiates an SSH connection to a DNG-protected host for the first time using DuoConnect, the user’s browser is opened to a login screen in order to complete authentication determined by the contents of the '-relay' argument. If the ‘-relay’ is set to a URL beginning with "http://", then the browser will initially attempt to load the URL over an insecure HTTP connection, before being immediately redirected to HTTPS (in addition to standard redirect mechanisms, the DNG uses HTTP Strict Transport Security headers to enforce this). After successfully authenticating to a DNG, DuoConnect stores an authentication token in a local system cache, so users do not have to complete this browser-based authentication workflow for every subsequent SSH connection. These tokens are valid for a configurable period of time, which defaults to 8 hours. If a user running DuoConnect already has a valid token, then instead of opening a web browser, DuoConnect directly contacts the DNG, again using the configured '-relay' value, and sends this token, as well as the intended SSH server hostname and port numbers. If the '-relay' argument begins with "http://", then this request will be sent over an insecure connection, and could be exposed to an attacker who is sniffing the traffic on the same network. The DNG authentication tokens that may be exposed during SSH relay may be used to gain network-level access to the servers and ports protected by that given relay host. The DNG provides network-level access only to the protected SSH servers. It does not interact with the independent SSH authentication and encryption. An attacker cannot use a stolen token on its own to authenticate against a DNG-protected SSH server. -
Initial Analysis by [email protected]
Jul. 24, 2020
Action Type Old Value New Value Added CVSS V2 Metadata Victim must voluntarily interact with attack mechanism Added CVSS V2 NIST (AV:A/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N) Added CVSS V3.1 NIST AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N Changed Reference Type https://duo.com/labs/psa/duo-psa-2020-003 No Types Assigned https://duo.com/labs/psa/duo-psa-2020-003 Patch, Vendor Advisory Added CWE NIST CWE-319 Added CPE Configuration OR *cpe:2.3:a:duo:duoconnect:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions up to (excluding) 1.1.1
CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration
While CVE identifies
specific instances of vulnerabilities, CWE categorizes the common flaws or
weaknesses that can lead to vulnerabilities. CVE-2020-3442
is
associated with the following CWEs:
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
(CAPEC)
stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the common attributes and
approaches employed by adversaries to exploit the CVE-2020-3442
weaknesses.
Exploit Prediction
EPSS is a daily estimate of the probability of exploitation activity being observed over the next 30 days.
0.06 }} 0.00%
score
0.21572
percentile