CVE-2023-28842
Docker Moby Encrypted Overlay Network Injection Vulnerability
Description
Moby) is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32` kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. The `overlay` driver dynamically and lazily defines the kernel configuration for the VXLAN network on each node as containers are attached and detached. Routes and encryption parameters are only defined for destination nodes that participate in the network. The iptables rules that prevent encrypted overlay networks from accepting unencrypted packets are not created until a peer is available with which to communicate. Encrypted overlay networks silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams. The implications of this can be quite dire, and GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw should be referenced for a deeper exploration. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. In multi-node clusters, deploy a global ‘pause’ container for each encrypted overlay network, on every node. For a single-node cluster, do not use overlay networks of any sort. Bridge networks provide the same connectivity on a single node and have no multi-node features. The Swarm ingress feature is implemented using an overlay network, but can be disabled by publishing ports in `host` mode instead of `ingress` mode (allowing the use of an external load balancer), and removing the `ingress` network. If encrypted overlay networks are in exclusive use, block UDP port 4789 from traffic that has not been validated by IPSec.
INFO
Published Date :
April 4, 2023, 10:15 p.m.
Last Modified :
Nov. 21, 2024, 7:56 a.m.
Source :
[email protected]
Remotely Exploitable :
Yes !
Impact Score :
4.0
Exploitability Score :
2.2
Public PoC/Exploit Available at Github
CVE-2023-28842 has a 1 public PoC/Exploit
available at Github.
Go to the Public Exploits
tab to see the list.
References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools
Here, you will find a curated list of external links that provide in-depth
information, practical solutions, and valuable tools related to
CVE-2023-28842
.
We scan GitHub repositories to detect new proof-of-concept exploits. Following list is a collection of public exploits and proof-of-concepts, which have been published on GitHub (sorted by the most recently updated).
Security advisory data for Wolfi
no-ghaudit-default-permissions
Shell
Results are limited to the first 15 repositories due to potential performance issues.
The following list is the news that have been mention
CVE-2023-28842
vulnerability anywhere in the article.
The following table lists the changes that have been made to the
CVE-2023-28842
vulnerability over time.
Vulnerability history details can be useful for understanding the evolution of a vulnerability, and for identifying the most recent changes that may impact the vulnerability's severity, exploitability, or other characteristics.
-
CVE Modified by af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108
Nov. 21, 2024
Action Type Old Value New Value Added Reference https://github.com/moby/libnetwork/security/advisories/GHSA-gvm4-2qqg-m333 Added Reference https://github.com/moby/moby/security/advisories/GHSA-232p-vwff-86mp Added Reference https://github.com/moby/moby/security/advisories/GHSA-33pg-m6jh-5237 Added Reference https://github.com/moby/moby/security/advisories/GHSA-6wrf-mxfj-pf5p Added Reference https://github.com/moby/moby/security/advisories/GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw Added Reference https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/LYZOKMMVX4SIEHPJW3SJUQGMO5YZCPHC/ Added Reference https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/XNF4OLYZRQE75EB5TW5N42FSXHBXGWFE/ Added Reference https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/ZTE4ITXXPIWZEQ4HYQCB6N6GZIMWXDAI/ -
CVE Modified by [email protected]
May. 14, 2024
Action Type Old Value New Value -
CVE Modified by [email protected]
Sep. 15, 2023
Action Type Old Value New Value Added Reference https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/XNF4OLYZRQE75EB5TW5N42FSXHBXGWFE/ [No Types Assigned] -
CVE Modified by [email protected]
Sep. 05, 2023
Action Type Old Value New Value Added Reference https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/LYZOKMMVX4SIEHPJW3SJUQGMO5YZCPHC/ [No Types Assigned] -
CVE Modified by [email protected]
Aug. 30, 2023
Action Type Old Value New Value Changed Description Moby) is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32` kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. The `overlay` driver dynamically and lazily defines the kernel configuration for the VXLAN network on each node as containers are attached and detached. Routes and encryption parameters are only defined for destination nodes that participate in the network. The iptables rules that prevent encrypted overlay networks from accepting unencrypted packets are not created until a peer is available with which to communicate. Encrypted overlay networks silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams. The implications of this can be quite dire, and GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw should be referenced for a deeper exploration. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. In multi-node clusters, deploy a global ‘pause’ container for each encrypted overlay network, on every node. For a single-node cluster, do not use overlay networks of any sort. Bridge networks provide the same connectivity on a single node and have no multi-node features. The Swarm ingress feature is implemented using an overlay network, but can be disabled by publishing ports in `host` mode instead of `ingress` mode (allowing the use of an external load balancer), and removing the `ingress` network. If encrypted overlay networks are in exclusive use, block UDP port 4789 from traffic that has not been validated by IPSec. Moby) is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32` kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. The `overlay` driver dynamically and lazily defines the kernel configuration for the VXLAN network on each node as containers are attached and detached. Routes and encryption parameters are only defined for destination nodes that participate in the network. The iptables rules that prevent encrypted overlay networks from accepting unencrypted packets are not created until a peer is available with which to communicate. Encrypted overlay networks silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams. The implications of this can be quite dire, and GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw should be referenced for a deeper exploration. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. In multi-node clusters, deploy a global ‘pause’ container for each encrypted overlay network, on every node. For a single-node cluster, do not use overlay networks of any sort. Bridge networks provide the same connectivity on a single node and have no multi-node features. The Swarm ingress feature is implemented using an overlay network, but can be disabled by publishing ports in `host` mode instead of `ingress` mode (allowing the use of an external load balancer), and removing the `ingress` network. If encrypted overlay networks are in exclusive use, block UDP port 4789 from traffic that has not been validated by IPSec. Added Reference https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/ZTE4ITXXPIWZEQ4HYQCB6N6GZIMWXDAI/ [No Types Assigned] -
Initial Analysis by [email protected]
Apr. 14, 2023
Action Type Old Value New Value Added CVSS V3.1 NIST AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N Changed Reference Type https://github.com/moby/libnetwork/security/advisories/GHSA-gvm4-2qqg-m333 No Types Assigned https://github.com/moby/libnetwork/security/advisories/GHSA-gvm4-2qqg-m333 Vendor Advisory Changed Reference Type https://github.com/moby/moby/security/advisories/GHSA-232p-vwff-86mp No Types Assigned https://github.com/moby/moby/security/advisories/GHSA-232p-vwff-86mp Not Applicable Changed Reference Type https://github.com/moby/moby/security/advisories/GHSA-33pg-m6jh-5237 No Types Assigned https://github.com/moby/moby/security/advisories/GHSA-33pg-m6jh-5237 Not Applicable Changed Reference Type https://github.com/moby/moby/security/advisories/GHSA-6wrf-mxfj-pf5p No Types Assigned https://github.com/moby/moby/security/advisories/GHSA-6wrf-mxfj-pf5p Mitigation, Vendor Advisory Changed Reference Type https://github.com/moby/moby/security/advisories/GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw No Types Assigned https://github.com/moby/moby/security/advisories/GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw Vendor Advisory Added CWE NIST CWE-755 Added CPE Configuration OR *cpe:2.3:a:mobyproject:moby:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 1.12.0 up to (excluding) 20.10.24 *cpe:2.3:a:mobyproject:moby:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 23.0.0 up to (excluding) 23.0.3
CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration
While CVE identifies
specific instances of vulnerabilities, CWE categorizes the common flaws or
weaknesses that can lead to vulnerabilities. CVE-2023-28842
is
associated with the following CWEs:
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
(CAPEC)
stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the common attributes and
approaches employed by adversaries to exploit the CVE-2023-28842
weaknesses.
Exploit Prediction
EPSS is a daily estimate of the probability of exploitation activity being observed over the next 30 days.
0.30 }} -0.00%
score
0.69195
percentile