CVE-2023-53333
netfilter: conntrack: dccp: copy entire header to stack buffer, not just basic one
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: conntrack: dccp: copy entire header to stack buffer, not just basic one Eric Dumazet says: nf_conntrack_dccp_packet() has an unique: dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, sizeof(_dh), &_dh); And nothing more is 'pulled' from the packet, depending on the content. dh->dccph_doff, and/or dh->dccph_x ...) So dccp_ack_seq() is happily reading stuff past the _dh buffer. BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in nf_conntrack_dccp_packet+0x1134/0x11c0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff000128f66e0c by task syz-executor.2/29371 [..] Fix this by increasing the stack buffer to also include room for the extra sequence numbers and all the known dccp packet type headers, then pull again after the initial validation of the basic header. While at it, mark packets invalid that lack 48bit sequence bit but where RFC says the type MUST use them. Compile tested only. v2: first skb_header_pointer() now needs to adjust the size to only pull the generic header. (Eric) Heads-up: I intend to remove dccp conntrack support later this year.
INFO
Published Date :
Sept. 16, 2025, 5:15 p.m.
Last Modified :
Sept. 16, 2025, 5:15 p.m.
Remotely Exploit :
No
Source :
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Affected Products
The following products are affected by CVE-2023-53333
vulnerability.
Even if cvefeed.io is aware of the exact versions of the
products
that
are
affected, the information is not represented in the table below.
No affected product recoded yet
Solution
- Increase stack buffer in nf_conntrack_dccp_packet.
- Pull header again after validation.
- Mark invalid packets missing sequence bits.
- Apply kernel updates when available.
References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools
Here, you will find a curated list of external links that provide in-depth
information, practical solutions, and valuable tools related to
CVE-2023-53333.
CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration
While CVE identifies
specific instances of vulnerabilities, CWE categorizes the common flaws or
weaknesses that can lead to vulnerabilities. CVE-2023-53333 is
associated with the following CWEs:
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
(CAPEC)
stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the common attributes and
approaches employed by adversaries to exploit the CVE-2023-53333
weaknesses.
We scan GitHub repositories to detect new proof-of-concept exploits. Following list is a collection of public exploits and proof-of-concepts, which have been published on GitHub (sorted by the most recently updated).
Results are limited to the first 15 repositories due to potential performance issues.
The following list is the news that have been mention
CVE-2023-53333 vulnerability anywhere in the article.
The following table lists the changes that have been made to the
CVE-2023-53333 vulnerability over time.
Vulnerability history details can be useful for understanding the evolution of a vulnerability, and for identifying the most recent changes that may impact the vulnerability's severity, exploitability, or other characteristics.
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New CVE Received by 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Sep. 16, 2025
Action Type Old Value New Value Added Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: conntrack: dccp: copy entire header to stack buffer, not just basic one Eric Dumazet says: nf_conntrack_dccp_packet() has an unique: dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, sizeof(_dh), &_dh); And nothing more is 'pulled' from the packet, depending on the content. dh->dccph_doff, and/or dh->dccph_x ...) So dccp_ack_seq() is happily reading stuff past the _dh buffer. BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in nf_conntrack_dccp_packet+0x1134/0x11c0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff000128f66e0c by task syz-executor.2/29371 [..] Fix this by increasing the stack buffer to also include room for the extra sequence numbers and all the known dccp packet type headers, then pull again after the initial validation of the basic header. While at it, mark packets invalid that lack 48bit sequence bit but where RFC says the type MUST use them. Compile tested only. v2: first skb_header_pointer() now needs to adjust the size to only pull the generic header. (Eric) Heads-up: I intend to remove dccp conntrack support later this year. Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/26bd1f210d3783a691052c51d76bb8a8bbd24c67 Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/337fdce450637ea663bc816edc2ba81e5cdad02e Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5c618daa5038712c4a4ef8923905a2ea1b8836a1 Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8c0980493beed3a80d6329c44ab293dc8c032927 Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9bdcda7abaf22f6453e5b5efb7eb4e524095d5d8 Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c052797ac36813419ad3bfa54cb8615db4b41f15 Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ff0a3a7d52ff7282dbd183e7fc29a1fe386b0c30