CVE-2024-39483
"Oracle KVM SVM NMI Forecasting Vulnerability"
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SVM: WARN on vNMI + NMI window iff NMIs are outright masked When requesting an NMI window, WARN on vNMI support being enabled if and only if NMIs are actually masked, i.e. if the vCPU is already handling an NMI. KVM's ABI for NMIs that arrive simultanesouly (from KVM's point of view) is to inject one NMI and pend the other. When using vNMI, KVM pends the second NMI simply by setting V_NMI_PENDING, and lets the CPU do the rest (hardware automatically sets V_NMI_BLOCKING when an NMI is injected). However, if KVM can't immediately inject an NMI, e.g. because the vCPU is in an STI shadow or is running with GIF=0, then KVM will request an NMI window and trigger the WARN (but still function correctly). Whether or not the GIF=0 case makes sense is debatable, as the intent of KVM's behavior is to provide functionality that is as close to real hardware as possible. E.g. if two NMIs are sent in quick succession, the probability of both NMIs arriving in an STI shadow is infinitesimally low on real hardware, but significantly larger in a virtual environment, e.g. if the vCPU is preempted in the STI shadow. For GIF=0, the argument isn't as clear cut, because the window where two NMIs can collide is much larger in bare metal (though still small). That said, KVM should not have divergent behavior for the GIF=0 case based on whether or not vNMI support is enabled. And KVM has allowed simultaneous NMIs with GIF=0 for over a decade, since commit 7460fb4a3400 ("KVM: Fix simultaneous NMIs"). I.e. KVM's GIF=0 handling shouldn't be modified without a *really* good reason to do so, and if KVM's behavior were to be modified, it should be done irrespective of vNMI support.
INFO
Published Date :
July 5, 2024, 7:15 a.m.
Last Modified :
Nov. 21, 2024, 9:27 a.m.
Source :
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Remotely Exploitable :
No
Impact Score :
3.6
Exploitability Score :
1.8
References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools
Here, you will find a curated list of external links that provide in-depth
information, practical solutions, and valuable tools related to
CVE-2024-39483
.
URL | Resource |
---|---|
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1d87cf2eba46deaff6142366127f2323de9f84d1 | Mailing List Patch |
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b4bd556467477420ee3a91fbcba73c579669edc6 | Mailing List Patch |
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f79edaf7370986d73d204b36c50cc563a4c0f356 | Mailing List Patch |
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1d87cf2eba46deaff6142366127f2323de9f84d1 | Mailing List Patch |
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b4bd556467477420ee3a91fbcba73c579669edc6 | Mailing List Patch |
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f79edaf7370986d73d204b36c50cc563a4c0f356 | Mailing List Patch |
We scan GitHub repositories to detect new proof-of-concept exploits. Following list is a collection of public exploits and proof-of-concepts, which have been published on GitHub (sorted by the most recently updated).
Results are limited to the first 15 repositories due to potential performance issues.
The following list is the news that have been mention
CVE-2024-39483
vulnerability anywhere in the article.

-
tripwire.com
VERT Threat Alert: August 2024 Patch Tuesday Analysis
Today’s VERT Alert addresses Microsoft’s August 2024 Security Updates. VERT is actively working on coverage for these vulnerabilities and expects to ship ASPL-1119 as soon as coverage is completed.CVE ... Read more
The following table lists the changes that have been made to the
CVE-2024-39483
vulnerability over time.
Vulnerability history details can be useful for understanding the evolution of a vulnerability, and for identifying the most recent changes that may impact the vulnerability's severity, exploitability, or other characteristics.
-
CVE Modified by af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108
Nov. 21, 2024
Action Type Old Value New Value Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1d87cf2eba46deaff6142366127f2323de9f84d1 Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b4bd556467477420ee3a91fbcba73c579669edc6 Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f79edaf7370986d73d204b36c50cc563a4c0f356 -
Initial Analysis by [email protected]
Jul. 08, 2024
Action Type Old Value New Value Added CVSS V3.1 NIST AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H Changed Reference Type https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1d87cf2eba46deaff6142366127f2323de9f84d1 No Types Assigned https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1d87cf2eba46deaff6142366127f2323de9f84d1 Mailing List, Patch Changed Reference Type https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b4bd556467477420ee3a91fbcba73c579669edc6 No Types Assigned https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b4bd556467477420ee3a91fbcba73c579669edc6 Mailing List, Patch Changed Reference Type https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f79edaf7370986d73d204b36c50cc563a4c0f356 No Types Assigned https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f79edaf7370986d73d204b36c50cc563a4c0f356 Mailing List, Patch Added CWE NIST NVD-CWE-noinfo Added CPE Configuration OR *cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions up to (excluding) 6.4 *cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 6.6 up to (excluding) 6.6.34 *cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 6.9 up to (excluding) 6.9.5 *cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.10.0:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:* *cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.10.0:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:* -
CVE Received by 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Jul. 05, 2024
Action Type Old Value New Value Added Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SVM: WARN on vNMI + NMI window iff NMIs are outright masked When requesting an NMI window, WARN on vNMI support being enabled if and only if NMIs are actually masked, i.e. if the vCPU is already handling an NMI. KVM's ABI for NMIs that arrive simultanesouly (from KVM's point of view) is to inject one NMI and pend the other. When using vNMI, KVM pends the second NMI simply by setting V_NMI_PENDING, and lets the CPU do the rest (hardware automatically sets V_NMI_BLOCKING when an NMI is injected). However, if KVM can't immediately inject an NMI, e.g. because the vCPU is in an STI shadow or is running with GIF=0, then KVM will request an NMI window and trigger the WARN (but still function correctly). Whether or not the GIF=0 case makes sense is debatable, as the intent of KVM's behavior is to provide functionality that is as close to real hardware as possible. E.g. if two NMIs are sent in quick succession, the probability of both NMIs arriving in an STI shadow is infinitesimally low on real hardware, but significantly larger in a virtual environment, e.g. if the vCPU is preempted in the STI shadow. For GIF=0, the argument isn't as clear cut, because the window where two NMIs can collide is much larger in bare metal (though still small). That said, KVM should not have divergent behavior for the GIF=0 case based on whether or not vNMI support is enabled. And KVM has allowed simultaneous NMIs with GIF=0 for over a decade, since commit 7460fb4a3400 ("KVM: Fix simultaneous NMIs"). I.e. KVM's GIF=0 handling shouldn't be modified without a *really* good reason to do so, and if KVM's behavior were to be modified, it should be done irrespective of vNMI support. Added Reference kernel.org https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f79edaf7370986d73d204b36c50cc563a4c0f356 [No types assigned] Added Reference kernel.org https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1d87cf2eba46deaff6142366127f2323de9f84d1 [No types assigned] Added Reference kernel.org https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b4bd556467477420ee3a91fbcba73c579669edc6 [No types assigned]
CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration
While CVE identifies
specific instances of vulnerabilities, CWE categorizes the common flaws or
weaknesses that can lead to vulnerabilities. CVE-2024-39483
is
associated with the following CWEs:
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
(CAPEC)
stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the common attributes and
approaches employed by adversaries to exploit the CVE-2024-39483
weaknesses.