CVE-2025-38722
habanalabs: fix UAF in export_dmabuf()
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: habanalabs: fix UAF in export_dmabuf() As soon as we'd inserted a file reference into descriptor table, another thread could close it. That's fine for the case when all we are doing is returning that descriptor to userland (it's a race, but it's a userland race and there's nothing the kernel can do about it). However, if we follow fd_install() with any kind of access to objects that would be destroyed on close (be it the struct file itself or anything destroyed by its ->release()), we have a UAF. dma_buf_fd() is a combination of reserving a descriptor and fd_install(). habanalabs export_dmabuf() calls it and then proceeds to access the objects destroyed on close. In particular, it grabs an extra reference to another struct file that will be dropped as part of ->release() for ours; that "will be" is actually "might have already been". Fix that by reserving descriptor before anything else and do fd_install() only when everything had been set up. As a side benefit, we no longer have the failure exit with file already created, but reference to underlying file (as well as ->dmabuf_export_cnt, etc.) not grabbed yet; unlike dma_buf_fd(), fd_install() can't fail.
INFO
Published Date :
Sept. 4, 2025, 4:15 p.m.
Last Modified :
Sept. 5, 2025, 5:47 p.m.
Remotely Exploit :
No
Source :
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Solution
- Reserve descriptor before any other operations.
- Perform fd_install only after setup is complete.
- Apply the provided patch to the Linux kernel.
- Update the Linux kernel to the latest version.
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CVE-2025-38722.
CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration
While CVE identifies
specific instances of vulnerabilities, CWE categorizes the common flaws or
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associated with the following CWEs:
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
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stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the common attributes and
approaches employed by adversaries to exploit the CVE-2025-38722
weaknesses.
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The following table lists the changes that have been made to the
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Vulnerability history details can be useful for understanding the evolution of a vulnerability, and for identifying the most recent changes that may impact the vulnerability's severity, exploitability, or other characteristics.
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New CVE Received by 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Sep. 04, 2025
Action Type Old Value New Value Added Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: habanalabs: fix UAF in export_dmabuf() As soon as we'd inserted a file reference into descriptor table, another thread could close it. That's fine for the case when all we are doing is returning that descriptor to userland (it's a race, but it's a userland race and there's nothing the kernel can do about it). However, if we follow fd_install() with any kind of access to objects that would be destroyed on close (be it the struct file itself or anything destroyed by its ->release()), we have a UAF. dma_buf_fd() is a combination of reserving a descriptor and fd_install(). habanalabs export_dmabuf() calls it and then proceeds to access the objects destroyed on close. In particular, it grabs an extra reference to another struct file that will be dropped as part of ->release() for ours; that "will be" is actually "might have already been". Fix that by reserving descriptor before anything else and do fd_install() only when everything had been set up. As a side benefit, we no longer have the failure exit with file already created, but reference to underlying file (as well as ->dmabuf_export_cnt, etc.) not grabbed yet; unlike dma_buf_fd(), fd_install() can't fail. Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/33927f3d0ecdcff06326d6e4edb6166aed42811c Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/40deceb38f9db759772d1c289c28fd2a543f57fc Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/55c232d7e0241f1d5120b595e7a9de24c75ed3d8 Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c07886761fd6251db6938d4e747002e3d150d231