CVE-2025-40043
net: nfc: nci: Add parameter validation for packet data
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: nfc: nci: Add parameter validation for packet data Syzbot reported an uninitialized value bug in nci_init_req, which was introduced by commit 5aca7966d2a7 ("Merge tag 'perf-tools-fixes-for-v6.17-2025-09-16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/perf/perf-tools"). This bug arises due to very limited and poor input validation that was done at nic_valid_size(). This validation only validates the skb->len (directly reflects size provided at the userspace interface) with the length provided in the buffer itself (interpreted as NCI_HEADER). This leads to the processing of memory content at the address assuming the correct layout per what opcode requires there. This leads to the accesses to buffer of `skb_buff->data` which is not assigned anything yet. Following the same silent drop of packets of invalid sizes at `nic_valid_size()`, add validation of the data in the respective handlers and return error values in case of failure. Release the skb if error values are returned from handlers in `nci_nft_packet` and effectively do a silent drop Possible TODO: because we silently drop the packets, the call to `nci_request` will be waiting for completion of request and will face timeouts. These timeouts can get excessively logged in the dmesg. A proper handling of them may require to export `nci_request_cancel` (or propagate error handling from the nft packets handlers).
INFO
Published Date :
Oct. 28, 2025, 12:15 p.m.
Last Modified :
Oct. 28, 2025, 12:15 p.m.
Remotely Exploit :
No
Source :
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Solution
- Update the Linux kernel to the latest version.
- Apply relevant security patches for nfc and nci components.
- Validate input data in packet handlers.
- Handle errors and manage skb release properly.
References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools
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information, practical solutions, and valuable tools related to
CVE-2025-40043.
CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration
While CVE identifies
specific instances of vulnerabilities, CWE categorizes the common flaws or
weaknesses that can lead to vulnerabilities. CVE-2025-40043 is
associated with the following CWEs:
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
(CAPEC)
stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the common attributes and
approaches employed by adversaries to exploit the CVE-2025-40043
weaknesses.
We scan GitHub repositories to detect new proof-of-concept exploits. Following list is a collection of public exploits and proof-of-concepts, which have been published on GitHub (sorted by the most recently updated).
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CVE-2025-40043 vulnerability anywhere in the article.
The following table lists the changes that have been made to the
CVE-2025-40043 vulnerability over time.
Vulnerability history details can be useful for understanding the evolution of a vulnerability, and for identifying the most recent changes that may impact the vulnerability's severity, exploitability, or other characteristics.
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New CVE Received by 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Oct. 28, 2025
Action Type Old Value New Value Added Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: nfc: nci: Add parameter validation for packet data Syzbot reported an uninitialized value bug in nci_init_req, which was introduced by commit 5aca7966d2a7 ("Merge tag 'perf-tools-fixes-for-v6.17-2025-09-16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/perf/perf-tools"). This bug arises due to very limited and poor input validation that was done at nic_valid_size(). This validation only validates the skb->len (directly reflects size provided at the userspace interface) with the length provided in the buffer itself (interpreted as NCI_HEADER). This leads to the processing of memory content at the address assuming the correct layout per what opcode requires there. This leads to the accesses to buffer of `skb_buff->data` which is not assigned anything yet. Following the same silent drop of packets of invalid sizes at `nic_valid_size()`, add validation of the data in the respective handlers and return error values in case of failure. Release the skb if error values are returned from handlers in `nci_nft_packet` and effectively do a silent drop Possible TODO: because we silently drop the packets, the call to `nci_request` will be waiting for completion of request and will face timeouts. These timeouts can get excessively logged in the dmesg. A proper handling of them may require to export `nci_request_cancel` (or propagate error handling from the nft packets handlers). Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0ba68bea1e356f466ad29449938bea12f5f3711f Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/74837bca0748763a77f77db47a0bdbe63b347628 Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8fcc7315a10a84264e55bb65ede10f0af20a983f Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9c328f54741bd5465ca1dc717c84c04242fac2e1 Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bfdda0123dde406dbff62e7e9136037e97998a15 Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c395d1e548cc68e84584ffa2e3ca9796a78bf7b9