CVE-2026-10582
Hugo 0.91.0 through 0.165.0 Server-Side Request Forgery via security.http.urls Lacking Destination Address Validation
Description
Hugo's security.http.urls allowlist is the only control on outbound fetches made by resources.GetRemote, and it inspects the URL text alone. CheckAllowedHTTPURL in config/security/securityConfig.go applies the configured pattern list and then re-checks a canonicalised form of an integer, hex or octal IPv4 host, but it never resolves the hostname and never inspects the address the HTTP client actually connects to. The client constructed in resources/resource_factories/create/create.go installs no dial-time hook, so no check occurs at connection time either. A hostname that resolves to a loopback, private or cloud-metadata address therefore satisfies the policy, and the response body is embedded in the generated site. An attacker who can supply a URL through content, for example a front-matter field or a CMS field, can make the build fetch an internal endpoint and publish the response in the static output, so the build artifact itself carries the data out.
INFO
Published Date :
Aug. 24, 2026, 11:16 a.m.
Last Modified :
Oct. 12, 2026, 3:10 p.m.
Remotely Exploit :
No
Source :
[email protected]
CVSS Scores
| Score | Version | Severity | Vector | Exploitability Score | Impact Score | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVSS | 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0 | |||||
| CVSS 3.1 | HIGH | 83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10 | ||||
| CVSS 3.1 | HIGH | [email protected] | ||||
| CVSS 3.1 | HIGH | MITRE-CVE | ||||
| CVSS 4.0 | HIGH | 83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10 | ||||
| CVSS 4.0 | HIGH | [email protected] |
Solution
- Implement hostname resolution checks before allowing outbound fetches.
- Validate resolved IP addresses against blocklists.
- Update security configurations to include IP-based checks.
- Avoid embedding external content directly into build artifacts.
References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools
Here, you will find a curated list of external links that provide in-depth
information, practical solutions, and valuable tools related to
CVE-2026-10582.
CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration
While CVE identifies
specific instances of vulnerabilities, CWE categorizes the common flaws or
weaknesses that can lead to vulnerabilities. CVE-2026-10582 is
associated with the following CWEs:
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
(CAPEC)
stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the common attributes and
approaches employed by adversaries to exploit the CVE-2026-10582
weaknesses.
We scan GitHub repositories to detect new proof-of-concept exploits. Following list is a collection of public exploits and proof-of-concepts, which have been published on GitHub (sorted by the most recently updated).
Results are limited to the first 15 repositories due to potential performance issues.
The following list is the news that have been mention
CVE-2026-10582 vulnerability anywhere in the article.
The following table lists the changes that have been made to the
CVE-2026-10582 vulnerability over time.
Vulnerability history details can be useful for understanding the evolution of a vulnerability, and for identifying the most recent changes that may impact the vulnerability's severity, exploitability, or other characteristics.
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CVE Translated by [email protected]
Oct. 12, 2026
Action Type Old Value New Value Added Translation Title: hugo de gohugoio, Description: La lista de permitidos 'security.http.urls' de Hugo es el único control sobre las recuperaciones salientes realizadas por 'resources.GetRemote', y solo inspecciona el texto de la URL. 'CheckAllowedHTTPURL' en 'config/security/securityConfig.go' aplica la lista de patrones configurada y luego vuelve a verificar una forma canonizada de un host IPv4 entero, hexadecimal u octal, pero nunca resuelve el nombre de host y nunca inspecciona la dirección a la que el 'cliente HTTP' realmente se conecta. El 'cliente' construido en 'resources/resource_factories/create/create.go' no instala ningún 'hook' en tiempo de conexión, por lo que tampoco se realiza ninguna verificación en el momento de la conexión. Un nombre de host que se resuelve en una dirección de 'loopback', privada o de metadatos de la nube, por lo tanto, satisface la política, y el cuerpo de la respuesta se incrusta en el sitio generado. Un 'atacante' que puede proporcionar una URL a través del contenido, por ejemplo, un campo de 'front-matter' o un campo de 'CMS', puede hacer que la compilación recupere un 'endpoint' interno y publique la respuesta en la salida estática, por lo que el artefacto de compilación en sí mismo extrae los datos. -
CVE Modified by 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0
Aug. 24, 2026
Action Type Old Value New Value Added SSVC {'id': 'CVE-2026-10582', 'role': 'CISA Coordinator', 'options': [{'exploitation': 'none'}, {'automatable': 'no'}, {'technicalImpact': 'partial'}], 'version': '2.0.3', 'timestamp': '2026-08-24T18:59:29.076098Z'} -
New CVE Received by [email protected]
Aug. 24, 2026
Action Type Old Value New Value Added Affected [{'vendor': 'gohugoio', 'product': 'hugo', 'versions': [{'status': 'affected', 'version': '0.91.0', 'versionType': 'semver', 'lessThanOrEqual': '0.165.0'}], 'collectionURL': 'https://github.com/gohugoio/hugo', 'defaultStatus': 'unaffected'}] Added Description Hugo's security.http.urls allowlist is the only control on outbound fetches made by resources.GetRemote, and it inspects the URL text alone. CheckAllowedHTTPURL in config/security/securityConfig.go applies the configured pattern list and then re-checks a canonicalised form of an integer, hex or octal IPv4 host, but it never resolves the hostname and never inspects the address the HTTP client actually connects to. The client constructed in resources/resource_factories/create/create.go installs no dial-time hook, so no check occurs at connection time either. A hostname that resolves to a loopback, private or cloud-metadata address therefore satisfies the policy, and the response body is embedded in the generated site. An attacker who can supply a URL through content, for example a front-matter field or a CMS field, can make the build fetch an internal endpoint and publish the response in the static output, so the build artifact itself carries the data out. Added CVSS V4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X Added CVSS V3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N Added CWE CWE-918 Added Reference https://github.com/gohugoio/hugo Added Reference https://github.com/gohugoio/hugo/blob/v0.165.0/config/security/securityConfig.go Added Reference https://github.com/gohugoio/hugo/blob/v0.165.0/resources/resource_factories/create/create.go Added Reference https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/hugo-through-server-side-request-forgery-via-security-http-urls-lacking-destination-address-validation