CVE-2026-10663
Use-after-free / double-free of the root USB device in the experimental USB host stack
Description
In Zephyr's experimental USB host stack (CONFIG_USB_HOST_STACK), usbh_device_disconnect() (subsys/usb/host/usbh_device.c) freed the root usb_device slab object without clearing the cached pointer ctx->root. The bus removal handler dev_removed_handler() (subsys/usb/host/usbh_core.c) decides what to tear down solely from ctx->root, checking only that it is non-NULL. Because UHC controller drivers (e.g. uhc_max3421e, uhc_mcux_common) synthesize UHC_EVT_DEV_REMOVED directly from physical bus line state with no debounce or state guard, an attacker with physical USB access (or a rogue device that bounces its connection) can deliver a second device-removed event after a root device disconnect. The handler then re-enters usbh_device_disconnect() with the dangling pointer, locking a mutex inside the freed object (use-after-free), removing the freed node from the device list, and calling k_mem_slab_free() on the already-freed block (double-free). If the slab block has been reissued to a newly attached device in between, this corrupts a live object. Impact is denial of service (crash) and memory corruption; the attack vector is physical/local. The flaw was introduced in v4.4.0 by the connect/disconnect refactor and is fixed by clearing ctx->root in usbh_device_disconnect() before freeing.
INFO
Published Date :
July 12, 2026, 5:16 p.m.
Last Modified :
July 12, 2026, 5:16 p.m.
Remotely Exploit :
No
Source :
[email protected]
Affected Products
The following products are affected by CVE-2026-10663
vulnerability.
Even if cvefeed.io is aware of the exact versions of the
products
that
are
affected, the information is not represented in the table below.
CVSS Scores
| Score | Version | Severity | Vector | Exploitability Score | Impact Score | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVSS 3.1 | MEDIUM | e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad | ||||
| CVSS 3.1 | MEDIUM | [email protected] |
Solution
- Clear ctx->root in usbh_device_disconnect() before freeing the slab object.
- Apply updates to the USB host stack.
- Ensure device connection/disconnection events are properly debounced.
- Validate physical USB connections.
References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools
Here, you will find a curated list of external links that provide in-depth
information, practical solutions, and valuable tools related to
CVE-2026-10663.
| URL | Resource |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/4b87a8f161a44cb19505fa97db7cf72f64d49165 | |
| https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-26q8-xjq3-f5p6 |
CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration
While CVE identifies
specific instances of vulnerabilities, CWE categorizes the common flaws or
weaknesses that can lead to vulnerabilities. CVE-2026-10663 is
associated with the following CWEs:
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
(CAPEC)
stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the common attributes and
approaches employed by adversaries to exploit the CVE-2026-10663
weaknesses.
We scan GitHub repositories to detect new proof-of-concept exploits. Following list is a collection of public exploits and proof-of-concepts, which have been published on GitHub (sorted by the most recently updated).
Results are limited to the first 15 repositories due to potential performance issues.
The following list is the news that have been mention
CVE-2026-10663 vulnerability anywhere in the article.
The following table lists the changes that have been made to the
CVE-2026-10663 vulnerability over time.
Vulnerability history details can be useful for understanding the evolution of a vulnerability, and for identifying the most recent changes that may impact the vulnerability's severity, exploitability, or other characteristics.
-
New CVE Received by [email protected]
Jul. 12, 2026
Action Type Old Value New Value Added Affected [{'vendor': 'zephyrproject', 'product': 'zephyr', 'versions': [{'status': 'affected', 'version': '4.4.0', 'lessThan': '4.5.0', 'versionType': 'semver'}], 'packageName': 'zephyr', 'collectionURL': 'https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr', 'defaultStatus': 'unaffected'}] Added Description In Zephyr's experimental USB host stack (CONFIG_USB_HOST_STACK), usbh_device_disconnect() (subsys/usb/host/usbh_device.c) freed the root usb_device slab object without clearing the cached pointer ctx->root. The bus removal handler dev_removed_handler() (subsys/usb/host/usbh_core.c) decides what to tear down solely from ctx->root, checking only that it is non-NULL. Because UHC controller drivers (e.g. uhc_max3421e, uhc_mcux_common) synthesize UHC_EVT_DEV_REMOVED directly from physical bus line state with no debounce or state guard, an attacker with physical USB access (or a rogue device that bounces its connection) can deliver a second device-removed event after a root device disconnect. The handler then re-enters usbh_device_disconnect() with the dangling pointer, locking a mutex inside the freed object (use-after-free), removing the freed node from the device list, and calling k_mem_slab_free() on the already-freed block (double-free). If the slab block has been reissued to a newly attached device in between, this corrupts a live object. Impact is denial of service (crash) and memory corruption; the attack vector is physical/local. The flaw was introduced in v4.4.0 by the connect/disconnect refactor and is fixed by clearing ctx->root in usbh_device_disconnect() before freeing. Added CVSS V3.1 AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H Added CWE CWE-416 Added Reference https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/4b87a8f161a44cb19505fa97db7cf72f64d49165 Added Reference https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-26q8-xjq3-f5p6