CVE-2026-12363
Out-of-bounds write in LoRaWAN fragmented transport from a fragment index of 0
Description
The LoRaWAN Fragmented Data Block Transport service (subsys/lorawan/services/frag_transport.c) does not validate the fragment counter in a received DATA_FRAGMENT command before forwarding it to the configured decoder. In frag_transport_package_callback() the value frag_counter = hdr->frag_index_n & 0x3FFF is taken directly from the downlink payload and passed to the decoder, which derives an array index and flash offset as frag_counter - 1. DataFragment fragments are 1-indexed, so a frag_counter of 0 underflows that arithmetic. With the default Semtech/LoRaMAC-node decoder, this reaches FragDecoder.FragNbMissingIndex[fragCounter - 1] = 0; in FragDecoderProcess(), where fragCounter - 1 evaluates to -1 and writes a uint16_t zero out of bounds, just before the array and into the adjacent MatrixM2B recovery-matrix state of the static decoder object (CWE-787). A companion write derives a wild flash offset, but that path is rejected by the flash_area_write() bounds check. The in-tree low-memory decoder (frag_dec()) is not corrupted: its out-of-range bit-array and flash accesses are caught by sys_bitarray_ and flash_area_ bounds checks. The handler is the registered downlink callback for the fragmentation transport port, reachable whenever an active fragmentation session exists, so the triggering byte is attacker-influenceable LoRaWAN/FUOTA network input. Triggering it requires authenticated downlinks (LoRaWAN MAC session keys or a malicious/compromised network or FUOTA server) and an active fragmentation session. The impact is contained: corruption of decoder state and denial of the firmware-update (FUOTA) session rather than controllable memory corruption or code execution. The fix adds a transport-layer check that rejects frag_counter == 0, closing the defect for both decoder backends.
INFO
Published Date :
Aug. 14, 2026, 6:17 p.m.
Last Modified :
Aug. 14, 2026, 8:16 p.m.
Remotely Exploit :
No
Source :
[email protected]
Affected Products
The following products are affected by CVE-2026-12363
vulnerability.
Even if cvefeed.io is aware of the exact versions of the
products
that
are
affected, the information is not represented in the table below.
CVSS Scores
| Score | Version | Severity | Vector | Exploitability Score | Impact Score | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVSS | 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0 | |||||
| CVSS 3.1 | MEDIUM | e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad | ||||
| CVSS 3.1 | MEDIUM | [email protected] | ||||
| CVSS 3.1 | MEDIUM | MITRE-CVE |
Solution
- Implement transport-layer check for frag_counter value.
- Reject fragment if frag_counter is zero.
- Ensure fragment counter is validated before processing.
- Update the fragmentation transport service.
References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools
Here, you will find a curated list of external links that provide in-depth
information, practical solutions, and valuable tools related to
CVE-2026-12363.
| URL | Resource |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/452c704a28369236e555543c61a1894cd1a4afbb | |
| https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-fvm7-7whg-8gj6 |
CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration
While CVE identifies
specific instances of vulnerabilities, CWE categorizes the common flaws or
weaknesses that can lead to vulnerabilities. CVE-2026-12363 is
associated with the following CWEs:
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
(CAPEC)
stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the common attributes and
approaches employed by adversaries to exploit the CVE-2026-12363
weaknesses.
We scan GitHub repositories to detect new proof-of-concept exploits. Following list is a collection of public exploits and proof-of-concepts, which have been published on GitHub (sorted by the most recently updated).
Results are limited to the first 15 repositories due to potential performance issues.
The following list is the news that have been mention
CVE-2026-12363 vulnerability anywhere in the article.
The following table lists the changes that have been made to the
CVE-2026-12363 vulnerability over time.
Vulnerability history details can be useful for understanding the evolution of a vulnerability, and for identifying the most recent changes that may impact the vulnerability's severity, exploitability, or other characteristics.
-
CVE Modified by 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0
Aug. 14, 2026
Action Type Old Value New Value Added SSVC {'id': 'CVE-2026-12363', 'role': 'CISA Coordinator', 'options': [{'exploitation': 'none'}, {'automatable': 'no'}, {'technicalImpact': 'partial'}], 'version': '2.0.3', 'timestamp': '2026-08-14T19:26:34.004071Z'} -
New CVE Received by [email protected]
Aug. 14, 2026
Action Type Old Value New Value Added Affected [{'vendor': 'zephyrproject', 'product': 'zephyr', 'versions': [{'status': 'affected', 'version': '3.7.0', 'lessThan': '4.5.0', 'versionType': 'semver'}], 'packageName': 'zephyr', 'programFiles': ['subsys/lorawan/services/frag_transport.c'], 'collectionURL': 'https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr', 'defaultStatus': 'unaffected'}] Added Description The LoRaWAN Fragmented Data Block Transport service (subsys/lorawan/services/frag_transport.c) does not validate the fragment counter in a received DATA_FRAGMENT command before forwarding it to the configured decoder. In frag_transport_package_callback() the value frag_counter = hdr->frag_index_n & 0x3FFF is taken directly from the downlink payload and passed to the decoder, which derives an array index and flash offset as frag_counter - 1. DataFragment fragments are 1-indexed, so a frag_counter of 0 underflows that arithmetic. With the default Semtech/LoRaMAC-node decoder, this reaches FragDecoder.FragNbMissingIndex[fragCounter - 1] = 0; in FragDecoderProcess(), where fragCounter - 1 evaluates to -1 and writes a uint16_t zero out of bounds, just before the array and into the adjacent MatrixM2B recovery-matrix state of the static decoder object (CWE-787). A companion write derives a wild flash offset, but that path is rejected by the flash_area_write() bounds check. The in-tree low-memory decoder (frag_dec()) is not corrupted: its out-of-range bit-array and flash accesses are caught by sys_bitarray_ and flash_area_ bounds checks. The handler is the registered downlink callback for the fragmentation transport port, reachable whenever an active fragmentation session exists, so the triggering byte is attacker-influenceable LoRaWAN/FUOTA network input. Triggering it requires authenticated downlinks (LoRaWAN MAC session keys or a malicious/compromised network or FUOTA server) and an active fragmentation session. The impact is contained: corruption of decoder state and denial of the firmware-update (FUOTA) session rather than controllable memory corruption or code execution. The fix adds a transport-layer check that rejects frag_counter == 0, closing the defect for both decoder backends. Added CVSS V3.1 AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L Added CWE CWE-787 Added Reference https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/452c704a28369236e555543c61a1894cd1a4afbb Added Reference https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-fvm7-7whg-8gj6