CVE-2026-130161
Tamari: SSRF via DNS rebinding bypasses is_safe_autofill_url() in recipe autofill
Description
Tamari is a fully-featured recipe manager web application built using Python and the Flask Framework. Prior to 1.7.2, an authenticated user can bypass the recipe-autofill SSRF check by submitting a hostname under the user's control through the Autofill from URL feature; the hostname can resolve to a public address during validation and a private or internal address during the later connection. In app/myrecipes/routes.py, is_safe_autofill_url validates the first DNS response, but recipe autofill passes the original URL to requests.get, which independently resolves the hostname and can connect to the internal address. The fetched response is parsed into recipe fields, enabling internal-service reconnaissance and potential data exposure; no redirect is required, and disabling redirects does not stop this DNS-rebinding bypass. This issue is fixed in 1.7.2.
INFO
Published Date :
Nov. 19, 2026, 7:48 p.m.
Last Modified :
Nov. 19, 2026, 7:48 p.m.
Remotely Exploit :
Yes !
Source :
GitHub_M
CVSS Scores
| Score | Version | Severity | Vector | Exploitability Score | Impact Score | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVSS 3.1 | MEDIUM | MITRE-CVE |
Solution
- Update Tamari to version 1.7.2 or later.
- Review and validate all input URLs for autofill functionality.
- Implement stricter DNS resolution and connection checks.
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