CVE-2026-18092
Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass via XML signature wrapping because new_from_xml reads assertion identity with document-wide XPath instead of the signed subtree
Description
Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass via XML signature wrapping because new_from_xml reads assertion identity with document-wide XPath instead of the signed subtree. new_from_xml reads the NameID, attribute values, SessionIndex, audience and other identity fields with document-wide XPath, such as //saml:Assertion/saml:AttributeStatement/saml:Attribute and //saml:Subject/saml:NameID, which select the first matching element in document order rather than the element covered by the verified signature. handle_response confirms that a signature is present and, when a cacert is configured, that it chains to the CA, but XML::Sig verifies only the element named by the signature's Reference URI, so unsigned sibling assertions in the same document are not covered. An attacker who holds any one IdP-signed assertion can add an unsigned attacker-authored assertion earlier in document order; the signature still verifies and the document-order XPath returns the attacker's NameID and attributes. Any caller that passes an untrusted Response to new_from_xml can accept identity fields from an assertion the IdP never signed, even when a cacert trust anchor is configured, so a party holding one valid IdP-signed assertion can authenticate as an arbitrary user.
INFO
Published Date :
Aug. 3, 2026, 2:16 p.m.
Last Modified :
Aug. 3, 2026, 2:16 p.m.
Remotely Exploit :
No
Source :
9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e
Affected Products
The following products are affected by CVE-2026-18092
vulnerability.
Even if cvefeed.io is aware of the exact versions of the
products
that
are
affected, the information is not represented in the table below.
No affected product recoded yet
Solution
- Update Net::SAML2 to version 0.86 or later.
- Ensure XML signatures cover the entire assertion.
- Validate XML documents carefully after signature verification.
References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools
Here, you will find a curated list of external links that provide in-depth
information, practical solutions, and valuable tools related to
CVE-2026-18092.
| URL | Resource |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/perl-net-saml2/perl-Net-SAML2/commit/201fead7f42b83f40c84bf4a311a25b09acd18f9.patch | |
| https://metacpan.org/release/TIMLEGGE/Net-SAML2-0.86/changes |
CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration
While CVE identifies
specific instances of vulnerabilities, CWE categorizes the common flaws or
weaknesses that can lead to vulnerabilities. CVE-2026-18092 is
associated with the following CWEs:
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
(CAPEC)
stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the common attributes and
approaches employed by adversaries to exploit the CVE-2026-18092
weaknesses.
We scan GitHub repositories to detect new proof-of-concept exploits. Following list is a collection of public exploits and proof-of-concepts, which have been published on GitHub (sorted by the most recently updated).
Results are limited to the first 15 repositories due to potential performance issues.
The following list is the news that have been mention
CVE-2026-18092 vulnerability anywhere in the article.
The following table lists the changes that have been made to the
CVE-2026-18092 vulnerability over time.
Vulnerability history details can be useful for understanding the evolution of a vulnerability, and for identifying the most recent changes that may impact the vulnerability's severity, exploitability, or other characteristics.
-
New CVE Received by 9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e
Aug. 03, 2026
Action Type Old Value New Value Added Affected [{'repo': 'https://github.com/perl-net-saml2/perl-Net-SAML2', 'vendor': 'TIMLEGGE', 'product': 'Net::SAML2', 'versions': [{'status': 'affected', 'version': '0', 'lessThan': '0.86', 'versionType': 'custom'}], 'packageName': 'Net-SAML2', 'programFiles': ['lib/Net/SAML2/Protocol/Assertion.pm', 'lib/Net/SAML2/Binding/POST.pm'], 'collectionURL': 'https://cpan.org/modules', 'defaultStatus': 'unaffected', 'programRoutines': [{'name': 'Net::SAML2::Protocol::Assertion::new_from_xml'}, {'name': 'Net::SAML2::Binding::POST::handle_response'}]}] Added Description Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass via XML signature wrapping because new_from_xml reads assertion identity with document-wide XPath instead of the signed subtree. new_from_xml reads the NameID, attribute values, SessionIndex, audience and other identity fields with document-wide XPath, such as //saml:Assertion/saml:AttributeStatement/saml:Attribute and //saml:Subject/saml:NameID, which select the first matching element in document order rather than the element covered by the verified signature. handle_response confirms that a signature is present and, when a cacert is configured, that it chains to the CA, but XML::Sig verifies only the element named by the signature's Reference URI, so unsigned sibling assertions in the same document are not covered. An attacker who holds any one IdP-signed assertion can add an unsigned attacker-authored assertion earlier in document order; the signature still verifies and the document-order XPath returns the attacker's NameID and attributes. Any caller that passes an untrusted Response to new_from_xml can accept identity fields from an assertion the IdP never signed, even when a cacert trust anchor is configured, so a party holding one valid IdP-signed assertion can authenticate as an arbitrary user. Added CWE CWE-347 Added Reference https://github.com/perl-net-saml2/perl-Net-SAML2/commit/201fead7f42b83f40c84bf4a311a25b09acd18f9.patch Added Reference https://metacpan.org/release/TIMLEGGE/Net-SAML2-0.86/changes