CVE-2026-28230
In SteVe, any authenticated charger can terminate any other charger's active transaction (missing ownership verification on StopTransaction)
Description
SteVe is an open-source EV charging station management system. In versions up to and including 3.11.0, when a charger sends a StopTransaction message, SteVe looks up the transaction solely by transactionId (a sequential integer starting from 1) without verifying that the requesting charger matches the charger that originally started the transaction. Any authenticated charger can terminate any other charger’s active session across the entire network. The root cause is in OcppServerRepositoryImpl.getTransaction() which queries only by transactionId with no chargeBoxId ownership check. The validator checks that the transaction exists and is not already stopped but never verifies identity. As an attacker controlling a single registered charger I could enumerate sequential transaction IDs and send StopTransaction messages targeting active sessions on every other charger on the network simultaneously. Combined with FINDING-014 (unauthenticated SOAP endpoints), no registered charger is even required — the attack is executable with a single curl command requiring only a known chargeBoxId. Commit 7f169c6c5b36a9c458ec41ce8af581972e5c724e contains a fix for the issue.
INFO
Published Date :
Feb. 26, 2026, 11:16 p.m.
Last Modified :
Feb. 26, 2026, 11:16 p.m.
Remotely Exploit :
Yes !
Source :
[email protected]
CVSS Scores
| Score | Version | Severity | Vector | Exploitability Score | Impact Score | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVSS 4.0 | HIGH | [email protected] |
Solution
- Apply the fix from commit 7f169c6c5b36a9c458ec41ce8af581972e5c724e.
- Ensure chargers are correctly associated with transactions.
- Verify charger identity before processing transaction requests.
References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools
Here, you will find a curated list of external links that provide in-depth
information, practical solutions, and valuable tools related to
CVE-2026-28230.
| URL | Resource |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/steve-community/steve/commit/7f169c6c5b36a9c458ec41ce8af581972e5c724e | |
| https://github.com/steve-community/steve/security/advisories/GHSA-6x38-4w7h-cwr8 |
CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration
While CVE identifies
specific instances of vulnerabilities, CWE categorizes the common flaws or
weaknesses that can lead to vulnerabilities. CVE-2026-28230 is
associated with the following CWEs:
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
(CAPEC)
stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the common attributes and
approaches employed by adversaries to exploit the CVE-2026-28230
weaknesses.
We scan GitHub repositories to detect new proof-of-concept exploits. Following list is a collection of public exploits and proof-of-concepts, which have been published on GitHub (sorted by the most recently updated).
Results are limited to the first 15 repositories due to potential performance issues.
The following list is the news that have been mention
CVE-2026-28230 vulnerability anywhere in the article.
The following table lists the changes that have been made to the
CVE-2026-28230 vulnerability over time.
Vulnerability history details can be useful for understanding the evolution of a vulnerability, and for identifying the most recent changes that may impact the vulnerability's severity, exploitability, or other characteristics.
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New CVE Received by [email protected]
Feb. 26, 2026
Action Type Old Value New Value Added Description SteVe is an open-source EV charging station management system. In versions up to and including 3.11.0, when a charger sends a StopTransaction message, SteVe looks up the transaction solely by transactionId (a sequential integer starting from 1) without verifying that the requesting charger matches the charger that originally started the transaction. Any authenticated charger can terminate any other charger’s active session across the entire network. The root cause is in OcppServerRepositoryImpl.getTransaction() which queries only by transactionId with no chargeBoxId ownership check. The validator checks that the transaction exists and is not already stopped but never verifies identity. As an attacker controlling a single registered charger I could enumerate sequential transaction IDs and send StopTransaction messages targeting active sessions on every other charger on the network simultaneously. Combined with FINDING-014 (unauthenticated SOAP endpoints), no registered charger is even required — the attack is executable with a single curl command requiring only a known chargeBoxId. Commit 7f169c6c5b36a9c458ec41ce8af581972e5c724e contains a fix for the issue. Added CVSS V4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X Added CWE CWE-284 Added Reference https://github.com/steve-community/steve/commit/7f169c6c5b36a9c458ec41ce8af581972e5c724e Added Reference https://github.com/steve-community/steve/security/advisories/GHSA-6x38-4w7h-cwr8