CVE-2026-43495
net: wwan: t7xx: validate port_count against message length in t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: wwan: t7xx: validate port_count against message length in t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler() uses the modem-supplied port_count field as a loop bound over port_msg->data[] without checking that the message buffer contains sufficient data. A modem sending port_count=65535 in a 12-byte buffer triggers a slab-out-of-bounds read of up to 262140 bytes. Add a sizeof(*port_msg) check before accessing the port message header fields to guard against undersized messages. Add a struct_size() check after extracting port_count and before the loop. In t7xx_parse_host_rt_data(), guard the rt_feature header read with a remaining-buffer check before accessing data_len, validate feat_data_len against the actual remaining buffer to prevent OOB reads and signed integer overflow on offset. Pass msg_len from both call sites: skb->len at the DPMAIF path after skb_pull(), and the validated feat_data_len at the handshake path.
INFO
Published Date :
May 21, 2026, 1:16 p.m.
Last Modified :
May 21, 2026, 1:16 p.m.
Remotely Exploit :
No
Source :
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Affected Products
The following products are affected by CVE-2026-43495
vulnerability.
Even if cvefeed.io is aware of the exact versions of the
products
that
are
affected, the information is not represented in the table below.
No affected product recoded yet
Solution
- Check message buffer size before accessing header fields.
- Validate port_count against remaining buffer size.
- Guard header reads with remaining-buffer checks.
- Validate data lengths against remaining buffer.
References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools
Here, you will find a curated list of external links that provide in-depth
information, practical solutions, and valuable tools related to
CVE-2026-43495.
CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration
While CVE identifies
specific instances of vulnerabilities, CWE categorizes the common flaws or
weaknesses that can lead to vulnerabilities. CVE-2026-43495 is
associated with the following CWEs:
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
(CAPEC)
stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the common attributes and
approaches employed by adversaries to exploit the CVE-2026-43495
weaknesses.
We scan GitHub repositories to detect new proof-of-concept exploits. Following list is a collection of public exploits and proof-of-concepts, which have been published on GitHub (sorted by the most recently updated).
Results are limited to the first 15 repositories due to potential performance issues.
The following list is the news that have been mention
CVE-2026-43495 vulnerability anywhere in the article.
The following table lists the changes that have been made to the
CVE-2026-43495 vulnerability over time.
Vulnerability history details can be useful for understanding the evolution of a vulnerability, and for identifying the most recent changes that may impact the vulnerability's severity, exploitability, or other characteristics.
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New CVE Received by 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
May. 21, 2026
Action Type Old Value New Value Added Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: wwan: t7xx: validate port_count against message length in t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler() uses the modem-supplied port_count field as a loop bound over port_msg->data[] without checking that the message buffer contains sufficient data. A modem sending port_count=65535 in a 12-byte buffer triggers a slab-out-of-bounds read of up to 262140 bytes. Add a sizeof(*port_msg) check before accessing the port message header fields to guard against undersized messages. Add a struct_size() check after extracting port_count and before the loop. In t7xx_parse_host_rt_data(), guard the rt_feature header read with a remaining-buffer check before accessing data_len, validate feat_data_len against the actual remaining buffer to prevent OOB reads and signed integer overflow on offset. Pass msg_len from both call sites: skb->len at the DPMAIF path after skb_pull(), and the validated feat_data_len at the handshake path. Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0e7c074cfcd9bd93765505f9eb8b42f03ed2a744 Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2b56d7903ab804481f5233a259d5f341e9fd513c Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9855e063e063158cc5bded576382599dc3133202 Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dd4f4c93c1488d7100b9964f2da4c8b3c29652f1 Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f94450ce5053b36002995b72d1fa1db3bb08c5bf