CVE-2026-44965
Datadog Android App Widget Unauthorized Activity Exposure
Description
In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v545-5.9.2, six App Widget configuration activities (IncidentWidgetActivity, MonitorSavedViewWidgetActivity, OnCallShiftsWidgetActivity, OnCallPagesWidgetActivity, SloWidgetActivity, DashboardWidgetActivity) are exported with no permission guard. Each accepts a caller-supplied AppWidgetManager.EXTRA_APPWIDGET_ID and, when no deep-link destination is resolved, uses it to load the matching widget's stored session and automatically log in as that user. Because Android widget IDs are small sequential integers, a co-installed application can brute-force this value to find one that matches a widget configured on the victim's device. This requires: A malicious application co-installed on the victim's device. At least one of the six widgets configured on the victim's home screen. An active Datadog session cached locally. Impact: The matching configuration activity opens in the foreground under the victim's session and renders live infrastructure data. Exposure is limited to a visual side channel (e.g., screen recording or accessibility services); the calling application cannot programmatically read the rendered data.
INFO
Published Date :
Aug. 7, 2026, 6:17 p.m.
Last Modified :
Sept. 3, 2026, 5:02 p.m.
Remotely Exploit :
No
Source :
[email protected]
Affected Products
The following products are affected by CVE-2026-44965
vulnerability.
Even if cvefeed.io is aware of the exact versions of the
products
that
are
affected, the information is not represented in the table below.
No affected product recoded yet
CVSS Scores
| Score | Version | Severity | Vector | Exploitability Score | Impact Score | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVSS | 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0 | |||||
| CVSS 3.1 | MEDIUM | 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0 |
Solution
- Set android:exported to "false" for widget activities.
- Implement permission checks for accessing widget activities.
- Validate AppWidgetManager.EXTRA_APPWIDGET_ID values.
- Update the Datadog Android application.
References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools
Here, you will find a curated list of external links that provide in-depth
information, practical solutions, and valuable tools related to
CVE-2026-44965.
CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration
While CVE identifies
specific instances of vulnerabilities, CWE categorizes the common flaws or
weaknesses that can lead to vulnerabilities. CVE-2026-44965 is
associated with the following CWEs:
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
(CAPEC)
stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the common attributes and
approaches employed by adversaries to exploit the CVE-2026-44965
weaknesses.
We scan GitHub repositories to detect new proof-of-concept exploits. Following list is a collection of public exploits and proof-of-concepts, which have been published on GitHub (sorted by the most recently updated).
Results are limited to the first 15 repositories due to potential performance issues.
The following list is the news that have been mention
CVE-2026-44965 vulnerability anywhere in the article.
The following table lists the changes that have been made to the
CVE-2026-44965 vulnerability over time.
Vulnerability history details can be useful for understanding the evolution of a vulnerability, and for identifying the most recent changes that may impact the vulnerability's severity, exploitability, or other characteristics.
-
CVE Modified by [email protected]
Aug. 08, 2026
Action Type Old Value New Value Changed Description Six Android App Widget configuration activities in the Datadog Android application are declared android:exported="true" with no permission guard: IncidentWidgetActivity, MonitorSavedViewWidgetActivity, OnCallShiftsWidgetActivity, OnCallPagesWidgetActivity, SloWidgetActivity, and DashboardWidgetActivity. All six extend a shared base WidgetActivity that reads AppWidgetManager.EXTRA_APPWIDGET_ID from Intent extras and, when no resolved deep-link destination is supplied, uses that caller-controlled widget ID to look up the stored widget definition, fetch the associated user session, and perform an automatic login with source UserSessionSourceLogin.Automatic. Android App Widget IDs are small sequential integers assigned by AppWidgetManager. A zero-permission co-installed application can brute-force them by launching any of the six configuration activities with EXTRA_APPWIDGET_ID set to 1..N until one matches a configured widget on the victim device. When a match occurs, the activity foregrounds with the victim's session already loaded and renders the widget configuration UI, which is backed by live data pickers (SLOs, dashboards, incident severities and types, on-call pages and shifts) fetched through the victim's authenticated HTTP client. Exfiltration is screen-visible only — programmatic return of data to the caller is not possible from these activities. Disclosure is therefore a visual side-channel: accessibility services, screen recording, or screenshot capture. Preconditions: a malicious co-installed application, at least one of the six widgets configured on the victim's home screen, and an active Datadog session cached locally. In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v545-5.9.2, six App Widget configuration activities (IncidentWidgetActivity, MonitorSavedViewWidgetActivity, OnCallShiftsWidgetActivity, OnCallPagesWidgetActivity, SloWidgetActivity, DashboardWidgetActivity) are exported with no permission guard. Each accepts a caller-supplied AppWidgetManager.EXTRA_APPWIDGET_ID and, when no deep-link destination is resolved, uses it to load the matching widget's stored session and automatically log in as that user. Because Android widget IDs are small sequential integers, a co-installed application can brute-force this value to find one that matches a widget configured on the victim's device. This requires: A malicious application co-installed on the victim's device. At least one of the six widgets configured on the victim's home screen. An active Datadog session cached locally. Impact: The matching configuration activity opens in the foreground under the victim's session and renders live infrastructure data. Exposure is limited to a visual side channel (e.g., screen recording or accessibility services); the calling application cannot programmatically read the rendered data. -
CVE Modified by 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0
Aug. 07, 2026
Action Type Old Value New Value Added CVSS V3.1 AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H Added SSVC {'id': 'CVE-2026-44965', 'role': 'CISA Coordinator', 'options': [{'exploitation': 'none'}, {'automatable': 'no'}, {'technicalImpact': 'partial'}], 'version': '2.0.3', 'timestamp': '2026-08-07T18:38:34.010393Z'} -
New CVE Received by [email protected]
Aug. 07, 2026
Action Type Old Value New Value Added Affected [{'vendor': 'Datadog', 'product': 'Android App', 'versions': [{'status': 'affected', 'version': '5.9.2', 'lessThan': '5.9.2', 'versionType': 'semver'}], 'defaultStatus': 'unaffected'}] Added Description Six Android App Widget configuration activities in the Datadog Android application are declared android:exported="true" with no permission guard: IncidentWidgetActivity, MonitorSavedViewWidgetActivity, OnCallShiftsWidgetActivity, OnCallPagesWidgetActivity, SloWidgetActivity, and DashboardWidgetActivity. All six extend a shared base WidgetActivity that reads AppWidgetManager.EXTRA_APPWIDGET_ID from Intent extras and, when no resolved deep-link destination is supplied, uses that caller-controlled widget ID to look up the stored widget definition, fetch the associated user session, and perform an automatic login with source UserSessionSourceLogin.Automatic. Android App Widget IDs are small sequential integers assigned by AppWidgetManager. A zero-permission co-installed application can brute-force them by launching any of the six configuration activities with EXTRA_APPWIDGET_ID set to 1..N until one matches a configured widget on the victim device. When a match occurs, the activity foregrounds with the victim's session already loaded and renders the widget configuration UI, which is backed by live data pickers (SLOs, dashboards, incident severities and types, on-call pages and shifts) fetched through the victim's authenticated HTTP client. Exfiltration is screen-visible only — programmatic return of data to the caller is not possible from these activities. Disclosure is therefore a visual side-channel: accessibility services, screen recording, or screenshot capture. Preconditions: a malicious co-installed application, at least one of the six widgets configured on the victim's home screen, and an active Datadog session cached locally. Added CWE CWE-926 Added Reference https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/926.html Added Reference https://developer.android.com/develop/ui/views/appwidgets/configuration Added Reference https://trust.datadoghq.com/?tcuUid=2e8b8fa5-39ca-43f4-9f6a-aeafafb440ef