## Summary A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in NukeViet CMS versions 4.x through 4.5.08. A low-privileged authenticated user can store a JavaScript payload in their profile's display name fields. The payload executes in the browser of any visitor — including administrators — who clicks the **Reply** ("Answer") link on a comment posted by that user. ## Affected Component The `{COMMENT.post_name}` template variable is interpolated without JavaScript-context escaping into an inline `onclick` handler in both comment block positions: - `themes/default/modules/comment/comment.tpl` line 27 (top-level comments) - `themes/default/modules/comment/comment.tpl` line 64 (nested/reply comments) ```html onclick="nv_commment_feedback(event, {COMMENT.cid}, '{COMMENT.post_name}')" ``` ## Root Cause The `first_name` and `last_name` profile fields are sanitized with HTML numeric character references (`'` → `&#039;`, `(` → `&#40;`, `)` → `&#41;`, `/` → `&#x002F;`) via `Request::_get_title()` with `$specialchars = true`. This encoding is correct for plain HTML attribute and element contexts, but **insufficient for a JavaScript string literal embedded inside an HTML attribute**. Browsers decode HTML entities in attribute values **before** the JavaScript engine parses the string. As a result, `&#039;` is decoded back to `'`, which terminates the JS string early and allows the remainder of the value to be executed as JavaScript. The combined display name (`nv_show_name_user(first_name, last_name)`) is what reaches the template, giving an attacker up to ~200 encoded characters across both fields — sufficient for any practical payload. ## Proof of Concept Set `first_name` to the following value in profile settings (`/index.php?nv=users&op=editinfo`), then post any comment: ```text a');alert(document.domain);// ``` The value is stored as `a&#039;&#41;;alert&#40;document.domain&#41;;&#x002F;&#x002F;`. When a visitor clicks the Reply link on the comment, the browser renders: ```js nv_commment_feedback(event, 1, 'a');alert(document.domain);// Tester') ``` causing `alert(document.domain)` to execute in the visitor's browser context. A data-exfiltration variant (split across both name fields) navigates the victim's browser to an attacker-controlled URL carrying `document.cookie` as a query parameter. End-to-end verification was performed using a local listener. ## Exploitation Conditions (default configuration) | Condition | Default value | Effect | |---|---|---| | `captcha_area_comm` | `1` | No CAPTCHA for logged-in users — payload delivery requires no CAPTCHA solve | | `auto_postcomm` | enabled | Comments are published immediately without moderation | | `active_editinfo_censor` | `0` | Profile edits take effect immediately without admin review | | CSP `script-src` | `'unsafe-inline'` | Inline `onclick` handlers execute normally | Any registered member can set the payload and post a comment with no additional steps. If `captcha_area_comm` is set to `0`, the `name` field of anonymous comments (`modules/comment/funcs/post.php`) is processed by the same `get_title(..., 1)` call, making exploitation possible without authentication. ## Impact An attacker with a regular user account can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the browser of any visitor who interacts with the Reply button on their comment, including site administrators. Practical consequences include: - **Privilege escalation via admin session hijacking** — forging administrative actions (content modification, account manipulation) in the context of an authenticated admin. - **Credential phishing** — injecting a fake login form into the page. - **Data exfiltration** — reading page content and non-`HttpOnly` cookies. > Note: NukeViet session cookies carry the `HttpOnly` flag, so they are not directly readable via `document.cookie`; however, the above attack vectors remain fully viable. ## Remediation **Preferred fix:** Remove `post_name` from the inline handler entirely. Pass only `cid` to `nv_commment_feedback` and have the function retrieve the display name from the already-rendered DOM (e.g., the adjacent `<strong class="cm_item">` element). **Alternative fix:** If the value must be passed inline, encode it with `json_encode($post_name)` (PHP) so that the output is a properly escaped JavaScript string literal, not an HTML-entity-encoded one. HTML numeric character references must not be relied upon for JavaScript string escaping. As a general note, the result of `get_title(..., $specialchars=true)` is safe for HTML element content and quoted HTML attribute values, but **unsafe when placed inside a JavaScript string literal within an attribute**. Other locations in the codebase using the same pattern should be audited. ## Resources - OWASP: Cross Site Scripting Prevention — Rule 2: Attribute Encoding is Not Sufficient for JS Contexts - CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation - CWE-116: Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output