CVE-2026-52738
ZEBRA: Finalized address balance credit-first overflow on consensus-valid blocks
Description
ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a consensus-valid block containing a long chain of transparent self-spends to one address can permanently halt Zebra nodes. In zebra-state/src/service/finalized_state/zebra_db/transparent.rs, the finalized-state writer originally applied every newly created output as a credit before applying any spent-output debit from the same block. That credit-first ordering can make the intermediate per-address balance exceed MAX_MONEY even though the final net balance is valid, causing an expect-based panic under the panic equals abort release profile. Because zcashd accepts the triggering block and Zebra encounters it again after every restart, the halt persists until patched software is deployed; exploitation requires mining the specially constructed block and temporarily committing sufficient ZEC to the self-spend chain. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.
INFO
Published Date :
Aug. 18, 2026, 8:17 p.m.
Last Modified :
Aug. 19, 2026, 4:17 p.m.
Remotely Exploit :
Yes !
Source :
[email protected]
CVSS Scores
| Score | Version | Severity | Vector | Exploitability Score | Impact Score | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVSS | 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0 | |||||
| CVSS 4.0 | MEDIUM | [email protected] |
Solution
- Update ZEBRA to version 4.5.0 or newer.
- Deploy patched software to all nodes.
References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools
Here, you will find a curated list of external links that provide in-depth
information, practical solutions, and valuable tools related to
CVE-2026-52738.
CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration
While CVE identifies
specific instances of vulnerabilities, CWE categorizes the common flaws or
weaknesses that can lead to vulnerabilities. CVE-2026-52738 is
associated with the following CWEs:
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
(CAPEC)
stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the common attributes and
approaches employed by adversaries to exploit the CVE-2026-52738
weaknesses.
We scan GitHub repositories to detect new proof-of-concept exploits. Following list is a collection of public exploits and proof-of-concepts, which have been published on GitHub (sorted by the most recently updated).
Results are limited to the first 15 repositories due to potential performance issues.
The following list is the news that have been mention
CVE-2026-52738 vulnerability anywhere in the article.
The following table lists the changes that have been made to the
CVE-2026-52738 vulnerability over time.
Vulnerability history details can be useful for understanding the evolution of a vulnerability, and for identifying the most recent changes that may impact the vulnerability's severity, exploitability, or other characteristics.
-
CVE Modified by 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0
Aug. 19, 2026
Action Type Old Value New Value Added SSVC {'id': 'CVE-2026-52738', 'role': 'CISA Coordinator', 'options': [{'exploitation': 'none'}, {'automatable': 'no'}, {'technicalImpact': 'partial'}], 'version': '2.0.3', 'timestamp': '2026-08-19T15:18:53.096673Z'} -
New CVE Received by [email protected]
Aug. 18, 2026
Action Type Old Value New Value Added Affected [{'vendor': 'ZcashFoundation', 'product': 'zebra', 'versions': [{'status': 'affected', 'version': '< 4.5.0'}]}, {'vendor': 'ZcashFoundation', 'product': 'zebra-state', 'versions': [{'status': 'affected', 'version': '< 7.0.0'}]}] Added Description ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a consensus-valid block containing a long chain of transparent self-spends to one address can permanently halt Zebra nodes. In zebra-state/src/service/finalized_state/zebra_db/transparent.rs, the finalized-state writer originally applied every newly created output as a credit before applying any spent-output debit from the same block. That credit-first ordering can make the intermediate per-address balance exceed MAX_MONEY even though the final net balance is valid, causing an expect-based panic under the panic equals abort release profile. Because zcashd accepts the triggering block and Zebra encounters it again after every restart, the halt persists until patched software is deployed; exploitation requires mining the specially constructed block and temporarily committing sufficient ZEC to the self-spend chain. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0. Added CVSS V4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X Added CWE CWE-248 Added Reference https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/commit/1440b43ca7df59aca948090d45117557b217a6cd Added Reference https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/releases/tag/v4.5.0 Added Reference https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-w834-cf6p-9m9w