Kargo manages and automates the promotion of software artifacts. From 0.6.0 until 1.8.14, 1.9.9, and 1.10.8, two authorization flaws in the `project-scoped RBAC API` let an authenticated user with delegated permission to manage a Project's `Roles` or `ServiceAccounts` confer permissions exceeding the user's own. A user authorized to edit `Roles` can create, replace, or add rules granting permissions not held by the user; a user authorized to edit a Role's ServiceAccount can bind an identity, including the user's own, to a more powerful Role. A Kargo Role comprises a `ServiceAccount, Role, and RoleBinding` in the Project namespace. Changes are written using the API server's broadly privileged credentials after only a coarse resource-kind edit check, rather than checking each permission being conferred. This permits escalation to Project-administrator access, disclosure of `Project Secrets` and credentials, and modification or deletion of Project resources. Stolen Git, container-registry, or Helm-registry credentials can extend confidentiality and integrity impacts to those external systems. Escalation remains limited to Projects where the attacker already has RBAC-management delegation and does not itself grant cluster-wide or cross-Project access. Default non-administrator roles do not permit these operations; exploitation requires an `administrator-created custom role` granting the relevant permissions and control of an account assigned that role. This issue is fixed in versions 1.8.14, 1.9.9, and 1.10.8.