0.0
NA
CVE-2026-63317
Apache OpenNLP: Arbitrary Class Instantiation in GeneratorFactory via Feature Descriptor XML
Description

Arbitrary Class Instantiation via XML Feature Generator Descriptor and Format Name in Apache OpenNLP Versions Affected: - before 2.5.10 - before 3.0.0-M5 Description: Three code paths in Apache OpenNLP load a class by its fully-qualified name via Class.forName() and invoke its no-arg constructor without any prior validation of the class name or its type.  The affected paths are: (1) GeneratorFactory, which reads the class attribute of generator elements in an XML feature generator descriptor; such descriptors are embedded as artifacts in model archives (e.g. TokenNameFinder and POSTagger models) and are parsed during model loading, so an attacker who can supply a crafted model archive controls the class name directly. (2) StreamFactoryRegistry.getFactory(Class, String), which falls back to interpreting an unregistered format name as the fully-qualified class name of an ObjectStreamFactory; this is exploitable in applications that pass untrusted format names (e.g. exposing the -format parameter of the command-line tooling to external input). (3) StringInterners, which instantiates the interner implementation named by the opennlp.interner.class system property; this value is normally deployer-controlled, so it is hardened as defense in depth rather than being independently attacker-reachable. Exploitation requires a class with attacker-useful side effects in its static initializer or no-arg constructor (JNDI lookup, outbound network I/O, filesystem access) to be present on the classpath, so this is not drop-in remote code execution. T Mitigation: Upgrade to a fixed release. The fix routes all three paths through ExtensionLoader.instantiateExtension(...), which consults a package-prefix allowlist before Class.forName() is invoked, so a disallowed class is never loaded, initialized, or constructed. Classes under the opennlp. prefix remain permitted by default. Deployments that load models referencing feature generator factories, object stream factories, or string interners outside opennlp.* must opt those packages in, either programmatically via ExtensionLoader.registerAllowedPackage(String) before the first model load, or by setting the OPENNLP_EXT_ALLOWED_PACKAGES system property to a comma-separated list of allowed package prefixes. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should ensure all model files and format names are sourced from trusted origins and should audit their classpath for classes with side-effecting static initializers or constructors.

INFO

Published Date :

July 24, 2026, 9:16 a.m.

Last Modified :

July 24, 2026, 9:16 a.m.

Remotely Exploit :

No
Affected Products

The following products are affected by CVE-2026-63317 vulnerability. Even if cvefeed.io is aware of the exact versions of the products that are affected, the information is not represented in the table below.

ID Vendor Product Action
1 Apache opennlp
Solution
Update Apache OpenNLP or configure allowed packages.
  • Upgrade to Apache OpenNLP version 2.5.10 or later.
  • Upgrade to Apache OpenNLP version 3.0.0-M5 or later.
  • Configure allowed packages using ExtensionLoader.
  • Set OPENNLP_EXT_ALLOWED_PACKAGES system property.
References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools

Here, you will find a curated list of external links that provide in-depth information, practical solutions, and valuable tools related to CVE-2026-63317.

URL Resource
https://lists.apache.org/thread/myr446n8t3gv8gq8wbpxm41olx16d8yj
CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration

While CVE identifies specific instances of vulnerabilities, CWE categorizes the common flaws or weaknesses that can lead to vulnerabilities. CVE-2026-63317 is associated with the following CWEs:

Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)

Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the common attributes and approaches employed by adversaries to exploit the CVE-2026-63317 weaknesses.

We scan GitHub repositories to detect new proof-of-concept exploits. Following list is a collection of public exploits and proof-of-concepts, which have been published on GitHub (sorted by the most recently updated).

Results are limited to the first 15 repositories due to potential performance issues.

The following list is the news that have been mention CVE-2026-63317 vulnerability anywhere in the article.

The following table lists the changes that have been made to the CVE-2026-63317 vulnerability over time.

Vulnerability history details can be useful for understanding the evolution of a vulnerability, and for identifying the most recent changes that may impact the vulnerability's severity, exploitability, or other characteristics.

  • New CVE Received by [email protected]

    Jul. 24, 2026

    Action Type Old Value New Value
    Added Affected [{'vendor': 'Apache Software Foundation', 'product': 'Apache OpenNLP', 'versions': [{'status': 'affected', 'version': '3.0.0-M1', 'lessThan': '3.0.0-M4', 'versionType': 'semver'}, {'status': 'affected', 'version': '0', 'lessThan': '2.5.11', 'versionType': 'semver'}], 'packageName': 'org.apache.opennlp:opennlp-tools', 'collectionURL': 'https://repo.maven.apache.org/maven2/', 'defaultStatus': 'unaffected'}]
    Added Description Arbitrary Class Instantiation via XML Feature Generator Descriptor and Format Name in Apache OpenNLP Versions Affected: - before 2.5.10 - before 3.0.0-M5 Description: Three code paths in Apache OpenNLP load a class by its fully-qualified name via Class.forName() and invoke its no-arg constructor without any prior validation of the class name or its type.  The affected paths are: (1) GeneratorFactory, which reads the class attribute of generator elements in an XML feature generator descriptor; such descriptors are embedded as artifacts in model archives (e.g. TokenNameFinder and POSTagger models) and are parsed during model loading, so an attacker who can supply a crafted model archive controls the class name directly. (2) StreamFactoryRegistry.getFactory(Class, String), which falls back to interpreting an unregistered format name as the fully-qualified class name of an ObjectStreamFactory; this is exploitable in applications that pass untrusted format names (e.g. exposing the -format parameter of the command-line tooling to external input). (3) StringInterners, which instantiates the interner implementation named by the opennlp.interner.class system property; this value is normally deployer-controlled, so it is hardened as defense in depth rather than being independently attacker-reachable. Exploitation requires a class with attacker-useful side effects in its static initializer or no-arg constructor (JNDI lookup, outbound network I/O, filesystem access) to be present on the classpath, so this is not drop-in remote code execution. T Mitigation: Upgrade to a fixed release. The fix routes all three paths through ExtensionLoader.instantiateExtension(...), which consults a package-prefix allowlist before Class.forName() is invoked, so a disallowed class is never loaded, initialized, or constructed. Classes under the opennlp. prefix remain permitted by default. Deployments that load models referencing feature generator factories, object stream factories, or string interners outside opennlp.* must opt those packages in, either programmatically via ExtensionLoader.registerAllowedPackage(String) before the first model load, or by setting the OPENNLP_EXT_ALLOWED_PACKAGES system property to a comma-separated list of allowed package prefixes. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should ensure all model files and format names are sourced from trusted origins and should audit their classpath for classes with side-effecting static initializers or constructors.
    Added CWE CWE-470
    Added Reference https://lists.apache.org/thread/myr446n8t3gv8gq8wbpxm41olx16d8yj
EPSS is a daily estimate of the probability of exploitation activity being observed over the next 30 days. Following chart shows the EPSS score history of the vulnerability.