CVE-2026-64527
drm/hyperv: validate VMBus packet size in receive callback
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/hyperv: validate VMBus packet size in receive callback hyperv_receive_sub() reads msg->vid_hdr.type and dispatches into one of four message-type branches without knowing how many bytes the host wrote into hv->recv_buf. The completion path then runs memcpy(hv->init_buf, msg, VMBUS_MAX_PACKET_SIZE), so the consumer that wakes on wait_for_completion_timeout() can read up to 16 KiB of residue from a prior message as if it were the response payload. Pass bytes_recvd into hyperv_receive_sub() and reject any packet that does not cover the pipe + synthvid header. A single switch on msg->vid_hdr.type then computes the type-specific payload size: the three completion-driving types (SYNTHVID_VERSION_RESPONSE, SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE, SYNTHVID_VRAM_LOCATION_ACK) fall through to a shared exit that requires that size before memcpy/complete, while SYNTHVID_FEATURE_CHANGE validates its own payload and returns before reading is_dirt_needed. Unknown types are dropped. SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE is variable length: the host fills resolution_count entries, not the full SYNTHVID_MAX_RESOLUTION_COUNT array. Validate the fixed prefix first so resolution_count can be read, bound it against the array, then require only the count-sized array, so the shorter responses the host actually sends are accepted. Only run the sub-handler when vmbus_recvpacket() returned success. The memcpy length is bytes_recvd, which is bounded by VMBUS_MAX_PACKET_SIZE only on a successful receive; on -ENOBUFS vmbus_recvpacket() instead reports the required length, which can exceed hv->recv_buf, so copying bytes_recvd would read and write past the 16 KiB buffers. Gating on the success return keeps the copy bounded. The nonzero-return path is itself a malformed-message case and is now logged rather than silently skipped; channel recovery is not attempted. Rejected packets are reported via drm_err_ratelimited() rather than silently dropped, matching the CoCo-hardened pattern in hv_kvp_onchannelcallback().
INFO
Published Date :
July 25, 2026, 10:17 a.m.
Last Modified :
July 25, 2026, 10:17 a.m.
Remotely Exploit :
No
Source :
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Affected Products
The following products are affected by CVE-2026-64527
vulnerability.
Even if cvefeed.io is aware of the exact versions of the
products
that
are
affected, the information is not represented in the table below.
No affected product recoded yet
Solution
- Apply the latest kernel patches for the Linux kernel.
- Update hyperv drivers to the latest version.
- Ensure proper validation of packet sizes.
- Log and handle malformed messages appropriately.
References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools
Here, you will find a curated list of external links that provide in-depth
information, practical solutions, and valuable tools related to
CVE-2026-64527.
CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration
While CVE identifies
specific instances of vulnerabilities, CWE categorizes the common flaws or
weaknesses that can lead to vulnerabilities. CVE-2026-64527 is
associated with the following CWEs:
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
(CAPEC)
stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the common attributes and
approaches employed by adversaries to exploit the CVE-2026-64527
weaknesses.
We scan GitHub repositories to detect new proof-of-concept exploits. Following list is a collection of public exploits and proof-of-concepts, which have been published on GitHub (sorted by the most recently updated).
Results are limited to the first 15 repositories due to potential performance issues.
The following list is the news that have been mention
CVE-2026-64527 vulnerability anywhere in the article.
The following table lists the changes that have been made to the
CVE-2026-64527 vulnerability over time.
Vulnerability history details can be useful for understanding the evolution of a vulnerability, and for identifying the most recent changes that may impact the vulnerability's severity, exploitability, or other characteristics.
-
New CVE Received by 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Jul. 25, 2026
Action Type Old Value New Value Added Affected [{'repo': 'https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git', 'vendor': 'Linux', 'product': 'Linux', 'versions': [{'status': 'affected', 'version': '76c56a5affeba1e163b66b9d8cc192e6154466f0', 'lessThan': '57d5d697642e05d5dd2d40660817765943dd709f', 'versionType': 'git'}, {'status': 'affected', 'version': '76c56a5affeba1e163b66b9d8cc192e6154466f0', 'lessThan': 'f5251226551bfec98c4705641b6f94ff1f238d91', 'versionType': 'git'}, {'status': 'affected', 'version': '76c56a5affeba1e163b66b9d8cc192e6154466f0', 'lessThan': '049a6b474823049fe60212f25f26e4b30f44ee8f', 'versionType': 'git'}, {'status': 'affected', 'version': '76c56a5affeba1e163b66b9d8cc192e6154466f0', 'lessThan': '588c84b461393ff1998ac7b97b04f953f642e0df', 'versionType': 'git'}, {'status': 'affected', 'version': '76c56a5affeba1e163b66b9d8cc192e6154466f0', 'lessThan': '164dc7bf17609340233c6bf4f66bb7c7008a0511', 'versionType': 'git'}, {'status': 'affected', 'version': '76c56a5affeba1e163b66b9d8cc192e6154466f0', 'lessThan': 'c8974d96b6a5496f33dc69a3ce28a7bf5078def4', 'versionType': 'git'}, {'status': 'affected', 'version': '76c56a5affeba1e163b66b9d8cc192e6154466f0', 'lessThan': '7f87763f47a3c22fb50265a00619ef10f2394b18', 'versionType': 'git'}], 'programFiles': ['drivers/gpu/drm/hyperv/hyperv_drm_proto.c'], 'defaultStatus': 'unaffected'}, {'repo': 'https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git', 'vendor': 'Linux', 'product': 'Linux', 'versions': [{'status': 'affected', 'version': '5.14'}, {'status': 'unaffected', 'version': '0', 'lessThan': '5.14', 'versionType': 'semver'}, {'status': 'unaffected', 'version': '5.15.210', 'versionType': 'semver', 'lessThanOrEqual': '5.15.*'}, {'status': 'unaffected', 'version': '6.1.176', 'versionType': 'semver', 'lessThanOrEqual': '6.1.*'}, {'status': 'unaffected', 'version': '6.6.143', 'versionType': 'semver', 'lessThanOrEqual': '6.6.*'}, {'status': 'unaffected', 'version': '6.12.93', 'versionType': 'semver', 'lessThanOrEqual': '6.12.*'}, {'status': 'unaffected', 'version': '6.18.35', 'versionType': 'semver', 'lessThanOrEqual': '6.18.*'}, {'status': 'unaffected', 'version': '7.0.12', 'versionType': 'semver', 'lessThanOrEqual': '7.0.*'}, {'status': 'unaffected', 'version': '7.1', 'versionType': 'original_commit_for_fix', 'lessThanOrEqual': '*'}], 'programFiles': ['drivers/gpu/drm/hyperv/hyperv_drm_proto.c'], 'defaultStatus': 'affected'}] Added Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/hyperv: validate VMBus packet size in receive callback hyperv_receive_sub() reads msg->vid_hdr.type and dispatches into one of four message-type branches without knowing how many bytes the host wrote into hv->recv_buf. The completion path then runs memcpy(hv->init_buf, msg, VMBUS_MAX_PACKET_SIZE), so the consumer that wakes on wait_for_completion_timeout() can read up to 16 KiB of residue from a prior message as if it were the response payload. Pass bytes_recvd into hyperv_receive_sub() and reject any packet that does not cover the pipe + synthvid header. A single switch on msg->vid_hdr.type then computes the type-specific payload size: the three completion-driving types (SYNTHVID_VERSION_RESPONSE, SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE, SYNTHVID_VRAM_LOCATION_ACK) fall through to a shared exit that requires that size before memcpy/complete, while SYNTHVID_FEATURE_CHANGE validates its own payload and returns before reading is_dirt_needed. Unknown types are dropped. SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE is variable length: the host fills resolution_count entries, not the full SYNTHVID_MAX_RESOLUTION_COUNT array. Validate the fixed prefix first so resolution_count can be read, bound it against the array, then require only the count-sized array, so the shorter responses the host actually sends are accepted. Only run the sub-handler when vmbus_recvpacket() returned success. The memcpy length is bytes_recvd, which is bounded by VMBUS_MAX_PACKET_SIZE only on a successful receive; on -ENOBUFS vmbus_recvpacket() instead reports the required length, which can exceed hv->recv_buf, so copying bytes_recvd would read and write past the 16 KiB buffers. Gating on the success return keeps the copy bounded. The nonzero-return path is itself a malformed-message case and is now logged rather than silently skipped; channel recovery is not attempted. Rejected packets are reported via drm_err_ratelimited() rather than silently dropped, matching the CoCo-hardened pattern in hv_kvp_onchannelcallback(). Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/049a6b474823049fe60212f25f26e4b30f44ee8f Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/164dc7bf17609340233c6bf4f66bb7c7008a0511 Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/57d5d697642e05d5dd2d40660817765943dd709f Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/588c84b461393ff1998ac7b97b04f953f642e0df Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7f87763f47a3c22fb50265a00619ef10f2394b18 Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c8974d96b6a5496f33dc69a3ce28a7bf5078def4 Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f5251226551bfec98c4705641b6f94ff1f238d91