0.0
NA
CVE-2026-64586
wifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal
Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal brcmf_fw_crashed() and the debugfs "reset" entry both schedule drvr->bus_reset, whose callback recovers drvr through container_of() and dereferences it. The removal path frees drvr (brcmf_free -> wiphy_free) without draining the work, so a bus_reset callback pending or running during removal can outlive drvr. Cancellation cannot live in brcmf_detach() or brcmf_free(): the work callback reaches teardown through the bus .reset op (PCIe brcmf_pcie_reset -> brcmf_detach; SDIO brcmf_sdio_bus_reset -> brcmf_sdiod_remove -> brcmf_free), so cancelling there would wait for the running work and deadlock. Add a per-bus mutex (bus_reset_lock) and route all arming through brcmf_bus_schedule_reset(), which under the lock skips when the bus is marked removing. Each bus remove entry calls brcmf_bus_cancel_reset_work(), which under the same lock sets removing and cancels the work. Holding the mutex across cancel_work_sync() makes the set-removing + drain step atomic. Every producer reaches the arming path from process context -- the PCIe firmware-halt notification runs in the threaded IRQ handler (brcmf_pcie_isr_thread) and the SDIO hostmail path runs from the data workqueue -- so the mutex is taken only in sleepable contexts. Where applicable the remove entry first stops the firmware-crash producer: on PCIe mask the mailbox and synchronize_irq; on SDIO unregister the bus interrupt and cancel the data worker, which also reports firmware halts through brcmf_fw_crashed(). The mutex is initialized at bus allocation. The SDIO suspend power-off path frees drvr through the same brcmf_sdiod_remove() and takes the same lock; resume re-allows the work only on a successful re-probe. Also guard brcmf_fw_crashed() against a NULL bus_if/drvr: it can fire before brcmf_attach() wires up drvr, and it dereferences drvr (bphy_err/brcmf_dev_coredump) before reaching the arming gate. The bus_reset work is shared across buses, so the drain is applied to every remove path: PCIe (the .reset op introduced by the Fixes commit), SDIO (arms the same work through brcmf_fw_crashed()), and USB (via the debugfs "reset" entry). cancel_work_sync() drains a running or pending bus_reset work item before removal frees drvr, and patch 1/2 makes the scratch-buffer release safe when reset teardown has already released those DMA buffers. This patch fixes the lifetime of the bus_reset work item itself. It does not attempt to address the separate, pre-existing lifetime of the asynchronous firmware completion started by the PCIe reset path. That callback needs its own lifetime/ownership protocol and is being tracked separately. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.

INFO

Published Date :

Aug. 6, 2026, 8:16 a.m.

Last Modified :

Aug. 6, 2026, 8:16 a.m.

Remotely Exploit :

No

Source :

416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Affected Products

The following products are affected by CVE-2026-64586 vulnerability. Even if cvefeed.io is aware of the exact versions of the products that are affected, the information is not represented in the table below.

No affected product recoded yet

Solution
Ensure bus_reset work is drained properly during device removal.
  • Apply the provided Linux kernel patches.
  • Ensure the bus_reset work item is always drained.
  • Guard brcmf_fw_crashed against NULL bus_if/drvr.
  • Re-allow work on successful re-probe after suspend.
References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools

Here, you will find a curated list of external links that provide in-depth information, practical solutions, and valuable tools related to CVE-2026-64586.

URL Resource
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/177a25be1195f8bdc6160ba5f1a5699f7041c985
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/43b25879f004c98defa2776bedc6ca4763c51945
CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration

While CVE identifies specific instances of vulnerabilities, CWE categorizes the common flaws or weaknesses that can lead to vulnerabilities. CVE-2026-64586 is associated with the following CWEs:

Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)

Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the common attributes and approaches employed by adversaries to exploit the CVE-2026-64586 weaknesses.

We scan GitHub repositories to detect new proof-of-concept exploits. Following list is a collection of public exploits and proof-of-concepts, which have been published on GitHub (sorted by the most recently updated).

Results are limited to the first 15 repositories due to potential performance issues.

The following list is the news that have been mention CVE-2026-64586 vulnerability anywhere in the article.

The following table lists the changes that have been made to the CVE-2026-64586 vulnerability over time.

Vulnerability history details can be useful for understanding the evolution of a vulnerability, and for identifying the most recent changes that may impact the vulnerability's severity, exploitability, or other characteristics.

  • New CVE Received by 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67

    Aug. 06, 2026

    Action Type Old Value New Value
    Added Affected [{'repo': 'https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git', 'vendor': 'Linux', 'product': 'Linux', 'versions': [{'status': 'affected', 'version': '4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3', 'lessThan': '177a25be1195f8bdc6160ba5f1a5699f7041c985', 'versionType': 'git'}, {'status': 'affected', 'version': '4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3', 'lessThan': '43b25879f004c98defa2776bedc6ca4763c51945', 'versionType': 'git'}], 'programFiles': ['drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/bcmsdh.c', 'drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/bus.h', 'drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/core.c', 'drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/pcie.c', 'drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/sdio.c', 'drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/sdio.h', 'drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/usb.c'], 'defaultStatus': 'unaffected'}, {'repo': 'https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git', 'vendor': 'Linux', 'product': 'Linux', 'versions': [{'status': 'affected', 'version': '5.2'}, {'status': 'unaffected', 'version': '0', 'lessThan': '5.2', 'versionType': 'semver'}, {'status': 'unaffected', 'version': '7.1.6', 'versionType': 'semver', 'lessThanOrEqual': '7.1.*'}, {'status': 'unaffected', 'version': '7.2-rc5', 'versionType': 'original_commit_for_fix', 'lessThanOrEqual': '*'}], 'programFiles': ['drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/bcmsdh.c', 'drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/bus.h', 'drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/core.c', 'drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/pcie.c', 'drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/sdio.c', 'drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/sdio.h', 'drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/usb.c'], 'defaultStatus': 'affected'}]
    Added Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal brcmf_fw_crashed() and the debugfs "reset" entry both schedule drvr->bus_reset, whose callback recovers drvr through container_of() and dereferences it. The removal path frees drvr (brcmf_free -> wiphy_free) without draining the work, so a bus_reset callback pending or running during removal can outlive drvr. Cancellation cannot live in brcmf_detach() or brcmf_free(): the work callback reaches teardown through the bus .reset op (PCIe brcmf_pcie_reset -> brcmf_detach; SDIO brcmf_sdio_bus_reset -> brcmf_sdiod_remove -> brcmf_free), so cancelling there would wait for the running work and deadlock. Add a per-bus mutex (bus_reset_lock) and route all arming through brcmf_bus_schedule_reset(), which under the lock skips when the bus is marked removing. Each bus remove entry calls brcmf_bus_cancel_reset_work(), which under the same lock sets removing and cancels the work. Holding the mutex across cancel_work_sync() makes the set-removing + drain step atomic. Every producer reaches the arming path from process context -- the PCIe firmware-halt notification runs in the threaded IRQ handler (brcmf_pcie_isr_thread) and the SDIO hostmail path runs from the data workqueue -- so the mutex is taken only in sleepable contexts. Where applicable the remove entry first stops the firmware-crash producer: on PCIe mask the mailbox and synchronize_irq; on SDIO unregister the bus interrupt and cancel the data worker, which also reports firmware halts through brcmf_fw_crashed(). The mutex is initialized at bus allocation. The SDIO suspend power-off path frees drvr through the same brcmf_sdiod_remove() and takes the same lock; resume re-allows the work only on a successful re-probe. Also guard brcmf_fw_crashed() against a NULL bus_if/drvr: it can fire before brcmf_attach() wires up drvr, and it dereferences drvr (bphy_err/brcmf_dev_coredump) before reaching the arming gate. The bus_reset work is shared across buses, so the drain is applied to every remove path: PCIe (the .reset op introduced by the Fixes commit), SDIO (arms the same work through brcmf_fw_crashed()), and USB (via the debugfs "reset" entry). cancel_work_sync() drains a running or pending bus_reset work item before removal frees drvr, and patch 1/2 makes the scratch-buffer release safe when reset teardown has already released those DMA buffers. This patch fixes the lifetime of the bus_reset work item itself. It does not attempt to address the separate, pre-existing lifetime of the asynchronous firmware completion started by the PCIe reset path. That callback needs its own lifetime/ownership protocol and is being tracked separately. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.
    Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/177a25be1195f8bdc6160ba5f1a5699f7041c985
    Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/43b25879f004c98defa2776bedc6ca4763c51945
EPSS is a daily estimate of the probability of exploitation activity being observed over the next 30 days. Following chart shows the EPSS score history of the vulnerability.