CVE-2026-68384
drm/xe/vf: Fix VF CCS attach/detach race with in-flight BO moves
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/vf: Fix VF CCS attach/detach race with in-flight BO moves xe_bo_move() attaches VF CCS read/write batch buffers (BBs) to a BO after it transitions NULL/SYSTEM -> TT, and detaches them after it transitions TT -> SYSTEM. Both operations were done synchronously on the CPU immediately after building the move's copy/clear fence, without waiting for that fence to signal. This creates two races with VF migration: - Attach happens too late relative to the copy job it is meant to protect. If the copy job is submitted before the CCS BBs are attached, a VF migration event that pauses execution mid-copy can observe partially copied CCS metadata without the attach state needed to correctly save/restore it. - Detach happens too early relative to the copy job that moves data out of TT. The CCS BBs are torn down right after the copy fence is obtained, while the actual blit may still be in flight. A VF migration event that pauses execution mid-copy can then race the save/restore path against the still-running blit, and the CCS BBs it would need to make sense of the paused state have already been removed. Fix both races: - Move the attach call to before the copy/clear job is submitted, so the CCS BBs are already registered by the time the copy runs. On attach failure, unwind and bail out of the move. xe_migrate_ccs_rw_copy() now takes the destination resource explicitly, since bo->ttm.resource is not updated to the new resource until after the move commits. - Detach only after explicitly waiting for the copy fence to signal, instead of tearing down the CCS BBs immediately after obtaining it. While here, also fix xe_sriov_vf_ccs_attach_bo() to properly unwind and propagate errors: the per-context loop previously never broke out on error, silently discarding earlier failures. Unwind by clearing each attached context directly via xe_migrate_ccs_rw_copy_clear() instead of reusing xe_sriov_vf_ccs_detach_bo(), which requires both contexts to be attached before it will clean up either one. (cherry picked from commit d45ad0aa7a1eb5d7288b5ed948b05695611dc39e)
INFO
Published Date :
Aug. 10, 2026, 1:20 p.m.
Last Modified :
Aug. 10, 2026, 1:20 p.m.
Remotely Exploit :
No
Source :
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Affected Products
The following products are affected by CVE-2026-68384
vulnerability.
Even if cvefeed.io is aware of the exact versions of the
products
that
are
affected, the information is not represented in the table below.
No affected product recoded yet
Solution
- Submit CCS BB attach before copy/clear job submission.
- Wait for copy fence before detaching CCS BBs.
- Unwind and propagate errors properly.
- Clean up attached contexts directly on error.
References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools
Here, you will find a curated list of external links that provide in-depth
information, practical solutions, and valuable tools related to
CVE-2026-68384.
CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration
While CVE identifies
specific instances of vulnerabilities, CWE categorizes the common flaws or
weaknesses that can lead to vulnerabilities. CVE-2026-68384 is
associated with the following CWEs:
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
(CAPEC)
stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the common attributes and
approaches employed by adversaries to exploit the CVE-2026-68384
weaknesses.
We scan GitHub repositories to detect new proof-of-concept exploits. Following list is a collection of public exploits and proof-of-concepts, which have been published on GitHub (sorted by the most recently updated).
Results are limited to the first 15 repositories due to potential performance issues.
The following list is the news that have been mention
CVE-2026-68384 vulnerability anywhere in the article.
The following table lists the changes that have been made to the
CVE-2026-68384 vulnerability over time.
Vulnerability history details can be useful for understanding the evolution of a vulnerability, and for identifying the most recent changes that may impact the vulnerability's severity, exploitability, or other characteristics.
-
New CVE Received by 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Aug. 10, 2026
Action Type Old Value New Value Added Affected [{'repo': 'https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git', 'vendor': 'Linux', 'product': 'Linux', 'versions': [{'status': 'affected', 'version': '864690cf4dd62482b6dd049d82c509886c904303', 'lessThan': '35ba43b541117bfb595e4b807ba447cf4335cc7d', 'versionType': 'git'}, {'status': 'affected', 'version': '864690cf4dd62482b6dd049d82c509886c904303', 'lessThan': 'f2ebfd5cc87f1393a30c8b8b0a6c20cb22cffa97', 'versionType': 'git'}, {'status': 'affected', 'version': '864690cf4dd62482b6dd049d82c509886c904303', 'lessThan': '56441f9e08ad68697295b8835266d2bc48ab59b5', 'versionType': 'git'}], 'programFiles': ['drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_bo.c', 'drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_migrate.c', 'drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_migrate.h', 'drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_sriov_vf_ccs.c', 'drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_sriov_vf_ccs.h'], 'defaultStatus': 'unaffected'}, {'repo': 'https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git', 'vendor': 'Linux', 'product': 'Linux', 'versions': [{'status': 'affected', 'version': '6.18'}, {'status': 'unaffected', 'version': '0', 'lessThan': '6.18', 'versionType': 'semver'}, {'status': 'unaffected', 'version': '6.18.42', 'versionType': 'semver', 'lessThanOrEqual': '6.18.*'}, {'status': 'unaffected', 'version': '7.1.6', 'versionType': 'semver', 'lessThanOrEqual': '7.1.*'}, {'status': 'unaffected', 'version': '7.2-rc4', 'versionType': 'original_commit_for_fix', 'lessThanOrEqual': '*'}], 'programFiles': ['drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_bo.c', 'drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_migrate.c', 'drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_migrate.h', 'drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_sriov_vf_ccs.c', 'drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_sriov_vf_ccs.h'], 'defaultStatus': 'affected'}] Added Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/vf: Fix VF CCS attach/detach race with in-flight BO moves xe_bo_move() attaches VF CCS read/write batch buffers (BBs) to a BO after it transitions NULL/SYSTEM -> TT, and detaches them after it transitions TT -> SYSTEM. Both operations were done synchronously on the CPU immediately after building the move's copy/clear fence, without waiting for that fence to signal. This creates two races with VF migration: - Attach happens too late relative to the copy job it is meant to protect. If the copy job is submitted before the CCS BBs are attached, a VF migration event that pauses execution mid-copy can observe partially copied CCS metadata without the attach state needed to correctly save/restore it. - Detach happens too early relative to the copy job that moves data out of TT. The CCS BBs are torn down right after the copy fence is obtained, while the actual blit may still be in flight. A VF migration event that pauses execution mid-copy can then race the save/restore path against the still-running blit, and the CCS BBs it would need to make sense of the paused state have already been removed. Fix both races: - Move the attach call to before the copy/clear job is submitted, so the CCS BBs are already registered by the time the copy runs. On attach failure, unwind and bail out of the move. xe_migrate_ccs_rw_copy() now takes the destination resource explicitly, since bo->ttm.resource is not updated to the new resource until after the move commits. - Detach only after explicitly waiting for the copy fence to signal, instead of tearing down the CCS BBs immediately after obtaining it. While here, also fix xe_sriov_vf_ccs_attach_bo() to properly unwind and propagate errors: the per-context loop previously never broke out on error, silently discarding earlier failures. Unwind by clearing each attached context directly via xe_migrate_ccs_rw_copy_clear() instead of reusing xe_sriov_vf_ccs_detach_bo(), which requires both contexts to be attached before it will clean up either one. (cherry picked from commit d45ad0aa7a1eb5d7288b5ed948b05695611dc39e) Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/35ba43b541117bfb595e4b807ba447cf4335cc7d Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/56441f9e08ad68697295b8835266d2bc48ab59b5 Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f2ebfd5cc87f1393a30c8b8b0a6c20cb22cffa97