CVE-2026-74700
net/sched: cls_api: Always acquire rtnl_lock when destroying locked classifiers
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: cls_api: Always acquire rtnl_lock when destroying locked classifiers Another challenge with unlocked filters. There is a short window in tc_new_tfilter where a tcf_proto can be found and briefly referenced by a totally unrelated, unlocked classifier's request and cause a race. Feng created a poc which created this race with two threads, one creating a u32 filter and other a flower filter in the same chain/prio: 1. Both threads enter tc_new_tfilter, both find the chain empty, both drop filter_chain_lock 2. u32 finishes tcf_proto_create("u32") first, calls tcf_chain_tp_insert_unique() -> inserts u32_tp into the chain 3. flower finishes tcf_proto_create("flower") later, calls tcf_chain_tp_insert_unique() -> tcf_chain_tp_find() now sees u32_tp already there, takes a reference on it, destroys flower's own tp_new and returns u32_tp to the caller. Flower then hits the kind mismatch check (because it requested for kind "flower" but tp->ops->kind is "u32") and goes through the errout path which calls tcf_proto_put() on u32_tp. If the u32 thread has already gone through its own errout (its change() call failed on the PoC's empty options) and dropped its create and insert refs, flower's put is the last one and drops u32_tp's refcnt to zero. At this point tp->ops->destroy() runs in a context that never took rtnl_lock. When that happens, it might cause a UAF like the following (illustrated by the PoC): [ +0.000710] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in u32_init (net/sched/cls_u32.c:393) [ +0.000281] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888120022f00 by task poc_feng_xue/524 Call Trace: u32_init (net/sched/cls_u32.c:393) tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2378) Allocated by task 526: u32_init (net/sched/cls_u32.c:378) tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2378) Freed by task 522: kfree u32_destroy (net/sched/cls_u32.c:662) tcf_proto_destroy (net/sched/cls_api.c:446) tcf_proto_put (net/sched/cls_api.c:459) tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2459) Fix this by having tcf_proto_destroy() take rtnl_lock around tp->ops->destroy() for locked classifiers whenever rtnl is not held. To explain why I used a temp variable "not_lockless" I'd like to point to a semi-related note on rtnl_held vs TCF_PROTO_OPS_DOIT_UNLOCKED (adding here for future cleanup if deemed necessary): The rtnl_held parameter and the TCF_PROTO_OPS_DOIT_UNLOCKED flag are redundant sources of truth for whether rtnl_lock is held. Among the nine classifier destroy(..rtnl_held..) callbacks, only flower consults the rtnl_held parameter which it propagates to tc_setup_cb_destroy() and tc_setup_cb_call(). The other eight (u32, flow, bpf, cgroup, route, basic, fw, mall) ignore it entirely;-> those that call tc_setup_cb_destroy() (u32, bpf, mall) hardcode true always instead of forwarding the parameter. A future cleanup should remove the rtnl_held parameter from the destroy callback signature entirely and have callers rely solely on their knowledge whether they are running in an unlocked context.
INFO
Published Date :
Aug. 22, 2026, 4:16 p.m.
Last Modified :
Aug. 22, 2026, 4:16 p.m.
Remotely Exploit :
No
Source :
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Solution
- Ensure rtnl_lock is acquired before classifier destruction.
- Apply kernel patches that address the race condition.
- Review classifier destruction logic for locking.
- Remove redundant locking status parameters.
References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools
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CVE-2026-74700.
CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration
While CVE identifies
specific instances of vulnerabilities, CWE categorizes the common flaws or
weaknesses that can lead to vulnerabilities. CVE-2026-74700 is
associated with the following CWEs:
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
(CAPEC)
stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the common attributes and
approaches employed by adversaries to exploit the CVE-2026-74700
weaknesses.
We scan GitHub repositories to detect new proof-of-concept exploits. Following list is a collection of public exploits and proof-of-concepts, which have been published on GitHub (sorted by the most recently updated).
Results are limited to the first 15 repositories due to potential performance issues.
The following list is the news that have been mention
CVE-2026-74700 vulnerability anywhere in the article.
The following table lists the changes that have been made to the
CVE-2026-74700 vulnerability over time.
Vulnerability history details can be useful for understanding the evolution of a vulnerability, and for identifying the most recent changes that may impact the vulnerability's severity, exploitability, or other characteristics.
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New CVE Received by 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Aug. 22, 2026
Action Type Old Value New Value Added Affected [{'repo': 'https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git', 'vendor': 'Linux', 'product': 'Linux', 'versions': [{'status': 'affected', 'version': '12db03b65c2b90752e4c37666977fd4a1b5f5824', 'lessThan': '34e77d8e3570f9df3952496ddb402833695662fd', 'versionType': 'git'}, {'status': 'affected', 'version': '12db03b65c2b90752e4c37666977fd4a1b5f5824', 'lessThan': 'b648c8a56531aeabd1c14f6b5cf1891e269b3756', 'versionType': 'git'}, {'status': 'affected', 'version': '12db03b65c2b90752e4c37666977fd4a1b5f5824', 'lessThan': 'd6222af7274f08e7a1848131dc30319993d8f377', 'versionType': 'git'}, {'status': 'affected', 'version': '12db03b65c2b90752e4c37666977fd4a1b5f5824', 'lessThan': 'a81f9c44d87fb59d99fce72e29e02cab3a49a1c3', 'versionType': 'git'}, {'status': 'affected', 'version': '12db03b65c2b90752e4c37666977fd4a1b5f5824', 'lessThan': 'a347304b2ca1a5377d5bd2d8a72e4b4f12afe648', 'versionType': 'git'}], 'programFiles': ['net/sched/cls_api.c'], 'defaultStatus': 'unaffected'}, {'repo': 'https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git', 'vendor': 'Linux', 'product': 'Linux', 'versions': [{'status': 'affected', 'version': '5.1'}, {'status': 'unaffected', 'version': '0', 'lessThan': '5.1', 'versionType': 'semver'}, {'status': 'unaffected', 'version': '6.6.152', 'versionType': 'semver', 'lessThanOrEqual': '6.6.*'}, {'status': 'unaffected', 'version': '6.12.104', 'versionType': 'semver', 'lessThanOrEqual': '6.12.*'}, {'status': 'unaffected', 'version': '6.18.45', 'versionType': 'semver', 'lessThanOrEqual': '6.18.*'}, {'status': 'unaffected', 'version': '7.1.9', 'versionType': 'semver', 'lessThanOrEqual': '7.1.*'}, {'status': 'unaffected', 'version': '7.2', 'versionType': 'original_commit_for_fix', 'lessThanOrEqual': '*'}], 'programFiles': ['net/sched/cls_api.c'], 'defaultStatus': 'affected'}] Added Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: cls_api: Always acquire rtnl_lock when destroying locked classifiers Another challenge with unlocked filters. There is a short window in tc_new_tfilter where a tcf_proto can be found and briefly referenced by a totally unrelated, unlocked classifier's request and cause a race. Feng created a poc which created this race with two threads, one creating a u32 filter and other a flower filter in the same chain/prio: 1. Both threads enter tc_new_tfilter, both find the chain empty, both drop filter_chain_lock 2. u32 finishes tcf_proto_create("u32") first, calls tcf_chain_tp_insert_unique() -> inserts u32_tp into the chain 3. flower finishes tcf_proto_create("flower") later, calls tcf_chain_tp_insert_unique() -> tcf_chain_tp_find() now sees u32_tp already there, takes a reference on it, destroys flower's own tp_new and returns u32_tp to the caller. Flower then hits the kind mismatch check (because it requested for kind "flower" but tp->ops->kind is "u32") and goes through the errout path which calls tcf_proto_put() on u32_tp. If the u32 thread has already gone through its own errout (its change() call failed on the PoC's empty options) and dropped its create and insert refs, flower's put is the last one and drops u32_tp's refcnt to zero. At this point tp->ops->destroy() runs in a context that never took rtnl_lock. When that happens, it might cause a UAF like the following (illustrated by the PoC): [ +0.000710] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in u32_init (net/sched/cls_u32.c:393) [ +0.000281] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888120022f00 by task poc_feng_xue/524 Call Trace: u32_init (net/sched/cls_u32.c:393) tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2378) Allocated by task 526: u32_init (net/sched/cls_u32.c:378) tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2378) Freed by task 522: kfree u32_destroy (net/sched/cls_u32.c:662) tcf_proto_destroy (net/sched/cls_api.c:446) tcf_proto_put (net/sched/cls_api.c:459) tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2459) Fix this by having tcf_proto_destroy() take rtnl_lock around tp->ops->destroy() for locked classifiers whenever rtnl is not held. To explain why I used a temp variable "not_lockless" I'd like to point to a semi-related note on rtnl_held vs TCF_PROTO_OPS_DOIT_UNLOCKED (adding here for future cleanup if deemed necessary): The rtnl_held parameter and the TCF_PROTO_OPS_DOIT_UNLOCKED flag are redundant sources of truth for whether rtnl_lock is held. Among the nine classifier destroy(..rtnl_held..) callbacks, only flower consults the rtnl_held parameter which it propagates to tc_setup_cb_destroy() and tc_setup_cb_call(). The other eight (u32, flow, bpf, cgroup, route, basic, fw, mall) ignore it entirely;-> those that call tc_setup_cb_destroy() (u32, bpf, mall) hardcode true always instead of forwarding the parameter. A future cleanup should remove the rtnl_held parameter from the destroy callback signature entirely and have callers rely solely on their knowledge whether they are running in an unlocked context. Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/34e77d8e3570f9df3952496ddb402833695662fd Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a347304b2ca1a5377d5bd2d8a72e4b4f12afe648 Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a81f9c44d87fb59d99fce72e29e02cab3a49a1c3 Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b648c8a56531aeabd1c14f6b5cf1891e269b3756 Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d6222af7274f08e7a1848131dc30319993d8f377