CVE-2026-80789
nvmet-tcp: bound SGL data length before allocating command buffers
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvmet-tcp: bound SGL data length before allocating command buffers nvmet_tcp_map_data() reads the host-controlled 32-bit sgl->length and, for the in-capsule offset descriptor (type 0x01), checks it against port->inline_data_size before use. Any other SGL descriptor type -- including the non-inline transport SGL data-block descriptor (type (NVME_TRANSPORT_SGL_DATA_DESC << 4) | NVME_SGL_FMT_TRANSPORT_A, the type a real host uses for out-of-capsule writes) skips that check entirely and falls straight through to: cmd->req.sg = sgl_alloc(len, GFP_KERNEL, &cmd->req.sg_cnt); with len taken directly from the wire, unbounded up to 4 GiB. nvmet_req_init() only parses the command and never inspects sgl->length, and nvmet_check_transfer_len() -- the only other place transfer_len is validated -- runs later, from req->execute(), after the allocation has already happened. For a write command the target responds with an R2T and parks the command waiting for the host to send the data; if the host (or an unauthenticated peer that simply never follows up) never does, the sgl_alloc() buffer stays resident for the life of the command. NVMe/TCP has no mandatory authentication in the default configuration, so any peer able to reach the target portal and complete a Fabrics connect can drive this with a single crafted command, repeatable across queues and connections for amplification. This is unbounded kernel memory allocation triggered by a remote, effectively unauthenticated peer. Validate len against the same NVMET_TCP_MAXH2CDATA ceiling this file already uses to bound per-PDU H2C data, for every SGL descriptor type, before doing any allocation. This closes the gap for the non-inline descriptor while leaving the existing, tighter inline_data_size check in place for the in-capsule case. Runtime-verified on a v6.19 KASAN stand: with this bound in place, a crafted write command carrying an oversized non-inline SGL length is rejected before sgl_alloc() runs, where the same request previously drove an unbounded ~256 MiB kernel allocation (up to 4 GiB) that stayed resident pending an R2T the host never satisfies.
INFO
Published Date :
Sept. 4, 2026, 4:18 p.m.
Last Modified :
Sept. 4, 2026, 4:18 p.m.
Remotely Exploit :
No
Source :
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Solution
- Validate SGL data length for all descriptor types.
- Enforce NVMET_TCP_MAXH2CDATA ceiling for allocations.
- Reject crafted commands with oversized SGL lengths.
- Update the Linux kernel to the patched version.
References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools
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CVE-2026-80789.
CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration
While CVE identifies
specific instances of vulnerabilities, CWE categorizes the common flaws or
weaknesses that can lead to vulnerabilities. CVE-2026-80789 is
associated with the following CWEs:
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
(CAPEC)
stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the common attributes and
approaches employed by adversaries to exploit the CVE-2026-80789
weaknesses.
We scan GitHub repositories to detect new proof-of-concept exploits. Following list is a collection of public exploits and proof-of-concepts, which have been published on GitHub (sorted by the most recently updated).
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The following table lists the changes that have been made to the
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Vulnerability history details can be useful for understanding the evolution of a vulnerability, and for identifying the most recent changes that may impact the vulnerability's severity, exploitability, or other characteristics.
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New CVE Received by 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Sep. 04, 2026
Action Type Old Value New Value Added Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvmet-tcp: bound SGL data length before allocating command buffers nvmet_tcp_map_data() reads the host-controlled 32-bit sgl->length and, for the in-capsule offset descriptor (type 0x01), checks it against port->inline_data_size before use. Any other SGL descriptor type -- including the non-inline transport SGL data-block descriptor (type (NVME_TRANSPORT_SGL_DATA_DESC << 4) | NVME_SGL_FMT_TRANSPORT_A, the type a real host uses for out-of-capsule writes) skips that check entirely and falls straight through to: cmd->req.sg = sgl_alloc(len, GFP_KERNEL, &cmd->req.sg_cnt); with len taken directly from the wire, unbounded up to 4 GiB. nvmet_req_init() only parses the command and never inspects sgl->length, and nvmet_check_transfer_len() -- the only other place transfer_len is validated -- runs later, from req->execute(), after the allocation has already happened. For a write command the target responds with an R2T and parks the command waiting for the host to send the data; if the host (or an unauthenticated peer that simply never follows up) never does, the sgl_alloc() buffer stays resident for the life of the command. NVMe/TCP has no mandatory authentication in the default configuration, so any peer able to reach the target portal and complete a Fabrics connect can drive this with a single crafted command, repeatable across queues and connections for amplification. This is unbounded kernel memory allocation triggered by a remote, effectively unauthenticated peer. Validate len against the same NVMET_TCP_MAXH2CDATA ceiling this file already uses to bound per-PDU H2C data, for every SGL descriptor type, before doing any allocation. This closes the gap for the non-inline descriptor while leaving the existing, tighter inline_data_size check in place for the in-capsule case. Runtime-verified on a v6.19 KASAN stand: with this bound in place, a crafted write command carrying an oversized non-inline SGL length is rejected before sgl_alloc() runs, where the same request previously drove an unbounded ~256 MiB kernel allocation (up to 4 GiB) that stayed resident pending an R2T the host never satisfies. Added Affected New affected value received. <a href="https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/blob/main/cves/2026/80xxx/CVE-2026-80789.json">CVE-2026-80789</a> Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0952541b153e258b99d39cdb03ea6919fdeb41d0 Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/14dbe37681a6a7e346fc147bb363ec7cca3180a0 Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/25ad03d5c0e858c4b63f1e4b6d461d2af1b30b22 Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4a3f00262a044e8e15064b1a6860968bf0500bf4 Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6d27199ebe8cb223022150f74be13f154a964474 Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d2acc96c528d589f5827cfb90e8e9229dd9d8cb4 Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d895e66628f939edbb98608f6e033d3d39e6e546 Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f63e89a0310264264923f84406dea05fe752de62 Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f6e51b09cbaa5f6f6e6a3a9dafa666f76c37aab5