0.0
NA
CVE-2026-90083
net/sched: act_ife: Only operate on Ethernet frames
Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: act_ife: Only operate on Ethernet frames act_ife encapsulates/decapsulates the original Ethernet header and uses skb->dev->hard_header_len as the length of that header. That is only correct for Ethernet devices: on a device where hard_header_len does not match the L2 header that was actually pulled (PPP reports PPP_HDRLEN while nothing is stripped on ingress), the ingress skb_push()/skb_pull() use the wrong length and can hit skb_under_panic when headroom is tight. IFE is Ethernet-only by design - it builds an outer ethhdr, rewrites h_source/h_dest/h_proto, and calls eth_type_trans() on decode - so instead of trying to make the offsets work for arbitrary link types, simply drop packets that do not carry an Ethernet header. Checking skb->dev->type alone is not enough. We have to cater for a corner case where mirred can redirect an skb from a non-Ethernet device to an Ethernet one, and skb->dev then says nothing about the framing the skb actually has: an skb redirected from ppp0 reaches the target's ingress hook with mac_len 0 and no Ethernet header at all. So at ingress also require mac_len to be ETH_HLEN. On egress mac_len is not maintained, so the device type is all we have; a bogus redirect there yields a malformed frame rather than an out-of-bounds push, and it would be malformed with or without IFE. That corner case is not theoretical - redirecting from ppp0 into a veth that has an ife encode action on its ingress hook panics without this patch: skbuff: skb_under_panic: len:98 put:14 head:ffff88800e410000 data:ffff88800e40fff5 tail:0x57 end:0x640 dev:veth3 kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:214! Call Trace: skb_push (net/core/skbuff.c:224 net/core/skbuff.c:2657) tcf_ife_act (net/sched/act_ife.c:829 net/sched/act_ife.c:874) tc_run (net/core/dev.c:4463) netif_receive_skb (net/core/dev.c:6463 net/core/dev.c:6522) tcf_mirred_to_dev (net/sched/act_mirred.c:248 net/sched/act_mirred.c:328) tcf_mirred_act (net/sched/act_mirred.c:489) tc_run (net/core/dev.c:4463) process_backlog (net/core/dev.c:6728) With Ethernet framing guaranteed, use ETH_HLEN instead of hard_header_len.

INFO

Published Date :

Sept. 17, 2026, 5:16 p.m.

Last Modified :

Sept. 17, 2026, 5:16 p.m.

Remotely Exploit :

No

Source :

416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Affected Products

The following products are affected by CVE-2026-90083 vulnerability. Even if cvefeed.io is aware of the exact versions of the products that are affected, the information is not represented in the table below.

ID Vendor Product Action
1 Linux linux_kernel
Solution
Ensure the system only processes Ethernet frames to prevent buffer underflows and panics.
  • Verify that the system only operates on Ethernet frames.
  • Ensure correct header lengths are used for packet processing.
  • Apply the provided patch to the Linux kernel.
  • Validate packet handling on devices with mismatched header lengths.
References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools

Here, you will find a curated list of external links that provide in-depth information, practical solutions, and valuable tools related to CVE-2026-90083.

URL Resource
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/138b0054021fd7d57bc3eb68b3f4e2bcec037849
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b483f7791b079bb97d411f1066652ff659207ff
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d218ea7df6eba076171f2d4897a429a31f2139f0
CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration

While CVE identifies specific instances of vulnerabilities, CWE categorizes the common flaws or weaknesses that can lead to vulnerabilities. CVE-2026-90083 is associated with the following CWEs:

Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)

Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the common attributes and approaches employed by adversaries to exploit the CVE-2026-90083 weaknesses.

We scan GitHub repositories to detect new proof-of-concept exploits. Following list is a collection of public exploits and proof-of-concepts, which have been published on GitHub (sorted by the most recently updated).

Results are limited to the first 15 repositories due to potential performance issues.

The following list is the news that have been mention CVE-2026-90083 vulnerability anywhere in the article.

The following table lists the changes that have been made to the CVE-2026-90083 vulnerability over time.

Vulnerability history details can be useful for understanding the evolution of a vulnerability, and for identifying the most recent changes that may impact the vulnerability's severity, exploitability, or other characteristics.

  • New CVE Received by 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67

    Sep. 17, 2026

    Action Type Old Value New Value
    Added Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: act_ife: Only operate on Ethernet frames act_ife encapsulates/decapsulates the original Ethernet header and uses skb->dev->hard_header_len as the length of that header. That is only correct for Ethernet devices: on a device where hard_header_len does not match the L2 header that was actually pulled (PPP reports PPP_HDRLEN while nothing is stripped on ingress), the ingress skb_push()/skb_pull() use the wrong length and can hit skb_under_panic when headroom is tight. IFE is Ethernet-only by design - it builds an outer ethhdr, rewrites h_source/h_dest/h_proto, and calls eth_type_trans() on decode - so instead of trying to make the offsets work for arbitrary link types, simply drop packets that do not carry an Ethernet header. Checking skb->dev->type alone is not enough. We have to cater for a corner case where mirred can redirect an skb from a non-Ethernet device to an Ethernet one, and skb->dev then says nothing about the framing the skb actually has: an skb redirected from ppp0 reaches the target's ingress hook with mac_len 0 and no Ethernet header at all. So at ingress also require mac_len to be ETH_HLEN. On egress mac_len is not maintained, so the device type is all we have; a bogus redirect there yields a malformed frame rather than an out-of-bounds push, and it would be malformed with or without IFE. That corner case is not theoretical - redirecting from ppp0 into a veth that has an ife encode action on its ingress hook panics without this patch: skbuff: skb_under_panic: len:98 put:14 head:ffff88800e410000 data:ffff88800e40fff5 tail:0x57 end:0x640 dev:veth3 kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:214! Call Trace: skb_push (net/core/skbuff.c:224 net/core/skbuff.c:2657) tcf_ife_act (net/sched/act_ife.c:829 net/sched/act_ife.c:874) tc_run (net/core/dev.c:4463) netif_receive_skb (net/core/dev.c:6463 net/core/dev.c:6522) tcf_mirred_to_dev (net/sched/act_mirred.c:248 net/sched/act_mirred.c:328) tcf_mirred_act (net/sched/act_mirred.c:489) tc_run (net/core/dev.c:4463) process_backlog (net/core/dev.c:6728) With Ethernet framing guaranteed, use ETH_HLEN instead of hard_header_len.
    Added Affected New affected value received. <a href="https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/blob/main/cves/2026/90xxx/CVE-2026-90083.json">CVE-2026-90083</a>
    Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/138b0054021fd7d57bc3eb68b3f4e2bcec037849
    Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b483f7791b079bb97d411f1066652ff659207ff
    Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d218ea7df6eba076171f2d4897a429a31f2139f0
EPSS is a daily estimate of the probability of exploitation activity being observed over the next 30 days. Following chart shows the EPSS score history of the vulnerability.