CVE-2026-91012
Apache Karaf: Path Traversal in Config Service Allows Manager-to-Admin Privilege Escalation
Description
org.apache.karaf.config.core.impl.ConfigRepositoryImpl#update(pid, properties), which backs the "config" MBean and the config:* shell commands, derives the file it writes a configuration to from caller-supplied input without checking that the result stays inside ${karaf.etc}: * if the submitted property map contains a felix.fileinstall.filename entry, that value is turned directly into a File (getCfgFileFromProperty), so it can point to any absolute path the Karaf process can write to; * otherwise the configuration PID is concatenated verbatim into the target file name (generateConfigFilename(): new File(karaf.etc, pid + ".cfg")), so a PID containing ".." segments resolves outside ${karaf.etc}. createFactoryConfiguration() has the same issue via the factory PID/alias. Both code paths are reachable by any caller holding the "manager" role under Karaf's shipped command/JMX ACL (org.apache.karaf.command.acl.conf.cfg: "update = manager"). Such a user can therefore write attacker-controlled content to any file the Karaf process can write, including files the same ACL otherwise reserves to "admin" (etc/users.properties, etc/*.acl.*.cfg, etc/org.apache.karaf.management.cfg, and similar), allowing a manager-role user to grant themselves the admin role or otherwise take over the container. ConfigMBeanImpl.install() and the config:install shell command already guarded the equivalent risk on their own code path with a finalname.contains("..") string check, but that check does not stop absolute paths or symlink-based escapes, and it was never applied to ConfigRepositoryImpl.update() / createFactoryConfiguration() at all.
INFO
Published Date :
Sept. 29, 2026, 9:17 a.m.
Last Modified :
Oct. 7, 2026, 8:16 p.m.
Remotely Exploit :
Yes !
Source :
[email protected]
CVSS Scores
| Score | Version | Severity | Vector | Exploitability Score | Impact Score | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVSS | 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0 | |||||
| CVSS 3.1 | CRITICAL | 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0 |
Solution
- Ensure configuration files are written only within the designated directory.
- Sanitize input to prevent directory traversal sequences.
- Update the Karaf process to apply input validation consistently.
- Review and restrict roles with 'manager' privileges.
References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools
Here, you will find a curated list of external links that provide in-depth
information, practical solutions, and valuable tools related to
CVE-2026-91012.
| URL | Resource |
|---|---|
| https://lists.apache.org/thread/op8trtz1qxkdwj2rjozhd9yt2yd6nhw4 | Mailing List Vendor Advisory |
| http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/28/8 | Mailing List Third Party Advisory |
CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration
While CVE identifies
specific instances of vulnerabilities, CWE categorizes the common flaws or
weaknesses that can lead to vulnerabilities. CVE-2026-91012 is
associated with the following CWEs:
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
(CAPEC)
stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the common attributes and
approaches employed by adversaries to exploit the CVE-2026-91012
weaknesses.
We scan GitHub repositories to detect new proof-of-concept exploits. Following list is a collection of public exploits and proof-of-concepts, which have been published on GitHub (sorted by the most recently updated).
Results are limited to the first 15 repositories due to potential performance issues.
The following list is the news that have been mention
CVE-2026-91012 vulnerability anywhere in the article.
The following table lists the changes that have been made to the
CVE-2026-91012 vulnerability over time.
Vulnerability history details can be useful for understanding the evolution of a vulnerability, and for identifying the most recent changes that may impact the vulnerability's severity, exploitability, or other characteristics.
-
Initial Analysis by [email protected]
Oct. 07, 2026
Action Type Old Value New Value Added CPE Configuration OR *cpe:2.3:a:apache:karaf:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions up to (excluding) 4.4.12 Added Reference Type Apache Software Foundation: https://lists.apache.org/thread/op8trtz1qxkdwj2rjozhd9yt2yd6nhw4 Types: Mailing List, Vendor Advisory Added Reference Type CVE: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/28/8 Types: Mailing List, Third Party Advisory -
CVE Modified by 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0
Oct. 01, 2026
Action Type Old Value New Value Added CVSS V3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Added CWE CWE-22 Added SSVC {'id': 'CVE-2026-91012', 'role': 'CISA Coordinator', 'options': [{'exploitation': 'none'}, {'automatable': 'yes'}, {'technicalImpact': 'total'}], 'version': '2.0.3', 'timestamp': '2026-10-01T14:10:12.183455Z'} -
CVE Modified by af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108
Sep. 29, 2026
Action Type Old Value New Value Added Reference http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/28/8 -
New CVE Received by [email protected]
Sep. 29, 2026
Action Type Old Value New Value Added Description org.apache.karaf.config.core.impl.ConfigRepositoryImpl#update(pid, properties), which backs the "config" MBean and the config:* shell commands, derives the file it writes a configuration to from caller-supplied input without checking that the result stays inside ${karaf.etc}: * if the submitted property map contains a felix.fileinstall.filename entry, that value is turned directly into a File (getCfgFileFromProperty), so it can point to any absolute path the Karaf process can write to; * otherwise the configuration PID is concatenated verbatim into the target file name (generateConfigFilename(): new File(karaf.etc, pid + ".cfg")), so a PID containing ".." segments resolves outside ${karaf.etc}. createFactoryConfiguration() has the same issue via the factory PID/alias. Both code paths are reachable by any caller holding the "manager" role under Karaf's shipped command/JMX ACL (org.apache.karaf.command.acl.conf.cfg: "update = manager"). Such a user can therefore write attacker-controlled content to any file the Karaf process can write, including files the same ACL otherwise reserves to "admin" (etc/users.properties, etc/*.acl.*.cfg, etc/org.apache.karaf.management.cfg, and similar), allowing a manager-role user to grant themselves the admin role or otherwise take over the container. ConfigMBeanImpl.install() and the config:install shell command already guarded the equivalent risk on their own code path with a finalname.contains("..") string check, but that check does not stop absolute paths or symlink-based escapes, and it was never applied to ConfigRepositoryImpl.update() / createFactoryConfiguration() at all. Added Affected New affected value received. <a href="https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/blob/main/cves/2026/91xxx/CVE-2026-91012.json">CVE-2026-91012</a> Added Reference https://lists.apache.org/thread/op8trtz1qxkdwj2rjozhd9yt2yd6nhw4