4.8
MEDIUM CVSS 3.1
CVE-2026-93673
WebSocket client accepts a handshake without verifying the full Sec-WebSocket-Accept value
Description

The Zephyr WebSocket client validates the server's handshake response in on_header_value() in subsys/net/lib/websocket/websocket.c. The comparison was performed as strncmp(at, str, length), where length is the length of the value the server sent rather than the length of the expected value, so the check only asked whether the received value was a prefix of the expected base64(SHA-1(key || GUID)). A server that returned a handful of correct characters passed, and a response carrying an empty Sec-WebSocket-Accept: header caused strncmp() to be called with a count of zero, which returns 0 and set ctx->sec_accept_ok with no comparison performed at all. The header-value callback also cleared ctx->sec_accept_present after the first chunk, so a value split across receive-buffer boundaries was only ever examined in part. ctx->sec_accept_ok is the sole WebSocket-specific gate in websocket_connect(); the client does not check the HTTP status code or the Upgrade:/Connection: headers. Any HTTP response containing an empty or prefix-matching Sec-WebSocket-Accept header therefore completed the handshake, after which the socket is finalized as a WebSocket and all further peer bytes are parsed as frames. The affected path is driven directly by remote input through subsys/net/lib/http/http_parser.c, and is reached by every user of websocket_connect(), including MQTT over WebSocket (subsys/net/lib/mqtt/mqtt_transport_websocket.c) and subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp.c. The Sec-WebSocket-Accept exchange is not a secret-based authentication -- an endpoint or on-path attacker that sees the request can compute the expected value -- so the impact is bounded to parties that never observed the handshake request: a caching or transparent intermediary replaying a canned response, an off-path attacker injecting a spoofed response, or a non-WebSocket endpoint the client was induced to talk to. For those, the per-connection binding that RFC 6455 requires the client to enforce provided no protection at all, letting a single crafted response convince the device it holds a live WebSocket session and causing it to send application data to, and accept frames from, an unverified peer. There is no memory-safety consequence. The fix compares each delivered chunk against the expected value at the position reached so far, refuses a chunk that would overrun it, and accepts only once every byte of the expected value -- and no more -- has been matched; on_header_field() now also clears the flag for any other header so a partial value cannot be continued across an intervening header.

INFO

Published Date :

Nov. 16, 2026, 10:18 p.m.

Last Modified :

Nov. 16, 2026, 10:18 p.m.

Remotely Exploit :

No
Affected Products

The following products are affected by CVE-2026-93673 vulnerability. Even if cvefeed.io is aware of the exact versions of the products that are affected, the information is not represented in the table below.

ID Vendor Product Action
1 Zephyrproject zephyr
2 Zephyrproject zephyr
CVSS Scores
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System is a standardized framework for assessing the severity of vulnerabilities in software and systems. We collect and displays CVSS scores from various sources for each CVE.
Score Version Severity Vector Exploitability Score Impact Score Source
CVSS 3.1 MEDIUM e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad
CVSS 3.1 MEDIUM MITRE-CVE
CVSS 3.1 MEDIUM [email protected]
Solution
Validate server handshake responses accurately by comparing the full expected value, not just a prefix or empty header.
  • Compare received handshake chunks against the full expected value.
  • Refuse chunks that would overrun the expected value.
  • Accept handshake only after the full expected value matches.
  • Clear header flags to prevent partial value continuation.
References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools

Here, you will find a curated list of external links that provide in-depth information, practical solutions, and valuable tools related to CVE-2026-93673.

URL Resource
https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/971a304afacf2bc72608ff3fc8cd23a74893654a
https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-vcpg-3c2r-7mxf
CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration

While CVE identifies specific instances of vulnerabilities, CWE categorizes the common flaws or weaknesses that can lead to vulnerabilities. CVE-2026-93673 is associated with the following CWEs:

We scan GitHub repositories to detect new proof-of-concept exploits. Following list is a collection of public exploits and proof-of-concepts, which have been published on GitHub (sorted by the most recently updated).

Results are limited to the first 15 repositories due to potential performance issues.

The following list is the news that have been mention CVE-2026-93673 vulnerability anywhere in the article.

The following table lists the changes that have been made to the CVE-2026-93673 vulnerability over time.

Vulnerability history details can be useful for understanding the evolution of a vulnerability, and for identifying the most recent changes that may impact the vulnerability's severity, exploitability, or other characteristics.

  • New CVE Received by [email protected]

    Nov. 16, 2026

    Action Type Old Value New Value
    Added Description The Zephyr WebSocket client validates the server's handshake response in on_header_value() in subsys/net/lib/websocket/websocket.c. The comparison was performed as strncmp(at, str, length), where length is the length of the value the server sent rather than the length of the expected value, so the check only asked whether the received value was a prefix of the expected base64(SHA-1(key || GUID)). A server that returned a handful of correct characters passed, and a response carrying an empty Sec-WebSocket-Accept: header caused strncmp() to be called with a count of zero, which returns 0 and set ctx->sec_accept_ok with no comparison performed at all. The header-value callback also cleared ctx->sec_accept_present after the first chunk, so a value split across receive-buffer boundaries was only ever examined in part. ctx->sec_accept_ok is the sole WebSocket-specific gate in websocket_connect(); the client does not check the HTTP status code or the Upgrade:/Connection: headers. Any HTTP response containing an empty or prefix-matching Sec-WebSocket-Accept header therefore completed the handshake, after which the socket is finalized as a WebSocket and all further peer bytes are parsed as frames. The affected path is driven directly by remote input through subsys/net/lib/http/http_parser.c, and is reached by every user of websocket_connect(), including MQTT over WebSocket (subsys/net/lib/mqtt/mqtt_transport_websocket.c) and subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp.c. The Sec-WebSocket-Accept exchange is not a secret-based authentication -- an endpoint or on-path attacker that sees the request can compute the expected value -- so the impact is bounded to parties that never observed the handshake request: a caching or transparent intermediary replaying a canned response, an off-path attacker injecting a spoofed response, or a non-WebSocket endpoint the client was induced to talk to. For those, the per-connection binding that RFC 6455 requires the client to enforce provided no protection at all, letting a single crafted response convince the device it holds a live WebSocket session and causing it to send application data to, and accept frames from, an unverified peer. There is no memory-safety consequence. The fix compares each delivered chunk against the expected value at the position reached so far, refuses a chunk that would overrun it, and accepts only once every byte of the expected value -- and no more -- has been matched; on_header_field() now also clears the flag for any other header so a partial value cannot be continued across an intervening header.
    Added CVSS V3.1 AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
    Added CWE CWE-345
    Added Affected New affected value received. <a href="https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/blob/main/cves/2026/93xxx/CVE-2026-93673.json">CVE-2026-93673</a>
    Added Reference https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/971a304afacf2bc72608ff3fc8cd23a74893654a
    Added Reference https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-vcpg-3c2r-7mxf
EPSS is a daily estimate of the probability of exploitation activity being observed over the next 30 days. Following chart shows the EPSS score history of the vulnerability.