In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pid_namespace: make zap_pid_ns_processes() freezable When the init of a pid namespace exits, zap_pid_ns_processes() waits until all other pids in the namespace are freed. A tracer outside the namespace that does not reap its traced zombies keeps those pids allocated, so this wait has no upper bound, and while it lasts every suspend attempt fails: Freezing user space processes failed after 20.006 seconds (2 tasks refusing to freeze, wq_busy=0): Neither wait is freezable. The first loop sleeps in do_wait(), which returns -ERESTARTSYS on the freezer's fake signal; the loop then clears TIF_SIGPENDING and waits again without ever freezing. The final loop sleeps in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, and since nothing clears TIF_SIGPENDING there, schedule() returns immediately after the first freeze attempt and the task spins until the wait ends. Sleep in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE | TASK_FREEZABLE in do_wait(), so that the freezer can freeze tasks waiting there directly, and in TASK_IDLE | TASK_FREEZABLE in the final loop, like coredump_task_exit() does. This was hit with Chromium-based browsers: crashpad ptrace-attaches the threads of a crashed renderer, which is a pid namespace init, and does not reap those killed during the dump.