CWE-134: Use of Externally-Controlled Format String

Description

The product uses a function that accepts a format string as an argument, but the format string originates from an external source.

Submission Date :

July 19, 2006, midnight

Modification Date :

2023-06-29 00:00:00+00:00

Organization :

MITRE
Extended Description

When an attacker can modify an externally-controlled format string, this can lead to buffer overflows, denial of service, or data representation problems.

It should be noted that in some circumstances, such as internationalization, the set of format strings is externally controlled by design. If the source of these format strings is trusted (e.g. only contained in library files that are only modifiable by the system administrator), then the external control might not itself pose a vulnerability.

Example Vulnerable Codes

Example - 1

The following program prints a string provided as an argument.



printf(string);

char buf[5012];memcpy(buf, argv[1], 5012);printWrapper(argv[1]);return (0);#include <stdio.h>void printWrapper(char *string) {}int main(int argc, char **argv) {}

The example is exploitable, because of the call to printf() in the printWrapper() function. Note: The stack buffer was added to make exploitation more simple.

Example - 2

The following code copies a command line argument into a buffer using snprintf().


char buf[128];...snprintf(buf,128,argv[1]);int main(int argc, char **argv){}

This code allows an attacker to view the contents of the stack and write to the stack using a command line argument containing a sequence of formatting directives. The attacker can read from the stack by providing more formatting directives, such as %x, than the function takes as arguments to be formatted. (In this example, the function takes no arguments to be formatted.) By using the %n formatting directive, the attacker can write to the stack, causing snprintf() to write the number of bytes output thus far to the specified argument (rather than reading a value from the argument, which is the intended behavior). A sophisticated version of this attack will use four staggered writes to completely control the value of a pointer on the stack.

Example - 3

Certain implementations make more advanced attacks even easier by providing format directives that control the location in memory to read from or write to. An example of these directives is shown in the following code, written for glibc:

printf("%d %d %1$d %1$d\n", 5, 9);

This code produces the following output: 5 9 5 5 It is also possible to use half-writes (%hn) to accurately control arbitrary DWORDS in memory, which greatly reduces the complexity needed to execute an attack that would otherwise require four staggered writes, such as the one mentioned in the first example.

Related Weaknesses

This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined to give an overview of the different insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction.

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