6.5
MEDIUM CVSS 3.1
CVE-2026-87042
Zephyr PTP: unvalidated Delay_Resp message interval lets an on-link peer wedge the PTP thread and flood the network
Description

The IEEE 1588 (PTP) port implementation in subsys/net/lib/ptp/port.c adopted the logMessageInterval field of a received Delay_Resp message without any validation. port_delay_resp_msg_process() stored the raw wire value (a full-range int8_t) into port_ds.log_min_delay_req_interval, and that value is later used as a shift count by port_timer_set_timeout() when the Delay_Req timer is armed. Values below about -30 truncate the computed timeout to zero, and values with a magnitude of 64 or more perform an undefined shift of a uint64_t; the standards-defined "not applicable" encoding 0x7F fell into the latter case as well. PTP messages are received over unauthenticated link-local traffic (UDP multicast on 224.0.1.129, IPv6 multicast, or raw IEEE 802.3), and the handler accepts a Delay_Resp from any sender as long as the port is a time receiver using the end-to-end delay mechanism and the message echoes the port identity and a pending sequence id — both of which the victim itself broadcasts in its Delay_Req. Any node on the same link can therefore inject a single crafted Delay_Resp, or simply become the time transmitter and advertise the bogus interval. Once the delay timer is armed with a zero timeout, the cooperative PTP thread re-arms and retransmits a Delay_Req on every tick. Each transmission takes a buffer from the fixed CONFIG_PTP_MSG_POLL_SIZE message slab (default 10) and holds it on port->delay_req_list for three seconds, so the slab is emptied within milliseconds and ptp_msg_alloc() then blocks with K_FOREVER inside the only thread that frees those buffers — permanently stalling time synchronization until reboot. Where a transmit-timestamp callback on another thread keeps recycling buffers, the result is instead a sustained multicast Delay_Req flood and continuous CPU consumption. There is no memory corruption and no disclosure of data; the impact is availability of the PTP subsystem and of the local network segment. The fix rejects intervals outside a representable range and treats 0x7F as "not applicable" as required by IEEE 1588-2019 Table 42. The equivalent unchecked adoption of logMessageInterval from Sync messages in port_sync_msg_process(), a weaker variant of the same issue, is fixed by the companion change 334bf57f416f (#118150), which applies the same range check, ignores the field for unicast Sync messages and treats 0x7F as not applicable.

INFO

Published Date :

Nov. 10, 2026, 10:21 p.m.

Last Modified :

Nov. 10, 2026, 10:21 p.m.

Remotely Exploit :

No
Affected Products

The following products are affected by CVE-2026-87042 vulnerability. Even if cvefeed.io is aware of the exact versions of the products that are affected, the information is not represented in the table below.

ID Vendor Product Action
1 Zephyrproject zephyr
2 Zephyrproject zephyr
CVSS Scores
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System is a standardized framework for assessing the severity of vulnerabilities in software and systems. We collect and displays CVSS scores from various sources for each CVE.
Score Version Severity Vector Exploitability Score Impact Score Source
CVSS 3.1 MEDIUM e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad
CVSS 3.1 MEDIUM [email protected]
CVSS 3.1 MEDIUM MITRE-CVE
Solution
Validate IEEE 1588 PTP messages and apply security patches to prevent denial-of-service.
  • Apply the provided security patch to the PTP implementation.
  • Validate logMessageInterval from PTP messages.
  • Treat 0x7F as 'not applicable'.
  • Reject intervals outside the representable range.
References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools
CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration

While CVE identifies specific instances of vulnerabilities, CWE categorizes the common flaws or weaknesses that can lead to vulnerabilities. CVE-2026-87042 is associated with the following CWEs:

Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)

Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the common attributes and approaches employed by adversaries to exploit the CVE-2026-87042 weaknesses.

We scan GitHub repositories to detect new proof-of-concept exploits. Following list is a collection of public exploits and proof-of-concepts, which have been published on GitHub (sorted by the most recently updated).

Results are limited to the first 15 repositories due to potential performance issues.

The following list is the news that have been mention CVE-2026-87042 vulnerability anywhere in the article.

The following table lists the changes that have been made to the CVE-2026-87042 vulnerability over time.

Vulnerability history details can be useful for understanding the evolution of a vulnerability, and for identifying the most recent changes that may impact the vulnerability's severity, exploitability, or other characteristics.

  • New CVE Received by [email protected]

    Nov. 10, 2026

    Action Type Old Value New Value
    Added Description The IEEE 1588 (PTP) port implementation in subsys/net/lib/ptp/port.c adopted the logMessageInterval field of a received Delay_Resp message without any validation. port_delay_resp_msg_process() stored the raw wire value (a full-range int8_t) into port_ds.log_min_delay_req_interval, and that value is later used as a shift count by port_timer_set_timeout() when the Delay_Req timer is armed. Values below about -30 truncate the computed timeout to zero, and values with a magnitude of 64 or more perform an undefined shift of a uint64_t; the standards-defined "not applicable" encoding 0x7F fell into the latter case as well. PTP messages are received over unauthenticated link-local traffic (UDP multicast on 224.0.1.129, IPv6 multicast, or raw IEEE 802.3), and the handler accepts a Delay_Resp from any sender as long as the port is a time receiver using the end-to-end delay mechanism and the message echoes the port identity and a pending sequence id — both of which the victim itself broadcasts in its Delay_Req. Any node on the same link can therefore inject a single crafted Delay_Resp, or simply become the time transmitter and advertise the bogus interval. Once the delay timer is armed with a zero timeout, the cooperative PTP thread re-arms and retransmits a Delay_Req on every tick. Each transmission takes a buffer from the fixed CONFIG_PTP_MSG_POLL_SIZE message slab (default 10) and holds it on port->delay_req_list for three seconds, so the slab is emptied within milliseconds and ptp_msg_alloc() then blocks with K_FOREVER inside the only thread that frees those buffers — permanently stalling time synchronization until reboot. Where a transmit-timestamp callback on another thread keeps recycling buffers, the result is instead a sustained multicast Delay_Req flood and continuous CPU consumption. There is no memory corruption and no disclosure of data; the impact is availability of the PTP subsystem and of the local network segment. The fix rejects intervals outside a representable range and treats 0x7F as "not applicable" as required by IEEE 1588-2019 Table 42. The equivalent unchecked adoption of logMessageInterval from Sync messages in port_sync_msg_process(), a weaker variant of the same issue, is fixed by the companion change 334bf57f416f (#118150), which applies the same range check, ignores the field for unicast Sync messages and treats 0x7F as not applicable.
    Added CVSS V3.1 AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
    Added CWE CWE-400
    Added Affected New affected value received. <a href="https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/blob/main/cves/2026/87xxx/CVE-2026-87042.json">CVE-2026-87042</a>
    Added Reference https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/334bf57f416f2f65745e68db98edf3615ec4e7ab
    Added Reference https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/f6b9459f082ac8cc18b7d20a5c4ce1d86b7a55b5
    Added Reference https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-cx9q-8hq3-7hpr
EPSS is a daily estimate of the probability of exploitation activity being observed over the next 30 days. Following chart shows the EPSS score history of the vulnerability.