CVE-2026-11985
Cross-thread FPU register leak on ARM when FPU enabled without register sharing
Description
On the Zephyr ARM port, enabling the hardware FPU (CONFIG_FPU) forces the "Floating point ABI" choice, which defaults to CONFIG_FP_HARDABI. Both FP_HARDABI and FP_SOFTABI permit the compiler to emit hardware FP instructions in any function, even code that never uses floating-point types. However, the callee-saved FP registers (s16-s31 / d8-d15) are only saved and restored across a context switch when CONFIG_FPU_SHARING is enabled (arch/arm/core/cortex_m/swap_helper.S and arch/arm/core/cortex_a_r/swap_helper.S), and prior to this fix selecting an ABI did not enable FPU register sharing, which defaults off. In a build that enables the FPU with the default ABI but leaves CONFIG_FPU_SHARING disabled, the kernel preserves no callee-saved FP register state across thread switches. The documented precondition for this "unshared" mode — that only a single thread ever executes FP instructions — is silently violated because the compiler may generate FP instructions in every thread. Under CONFIG_USERSPACE, where threads are mutually isolated, this becomes an information-disclosure boundary crossing: a victim thread can leave secret-derived values in s16-s31, and a co-resident unprivileged thread can read those registers directly (FP register access is not privilege-gated), recovering data left behind by another thread. Without userspace the same defect causes cross-thread FP state corruption (a correctness fault). The leak is bounded to the 16 callee-saved single-precision registers and is opportunistic, so impact is low. The fix makes FP_HARDABI and FP_SOFTABI select CONFIG_FPU_SHARING and tags every thread with K_FP_REGS at creation, so callee-saved FP state is always preserved across context switches whenever the compiler may emit FP instructions.
INFO
Published Date :
Aug. 11, 2026, 5:17 a.m.
Last Modified :
Aug. 11, 2026, 5:17 a.m.
Remotely Exploit :
No
Source :
[email protected]
Affected Products
The following products are affected by CVE-2026-11985
vulnerability.
Even if cvefeed.io is aware of the exact versions of the
products
that
are
affected, the information is not represented in the table below.
CVSS Scores
| Score | Version | Severity | Vector | Exploitability Score | Impact Score | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVSS 3.1 | LOW | e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad | ||||
| CVSS 3.1 | LOW | [email protected] |
Solution
- Enable CONFIG_FPU_SHARING when FPU is enabled.
- Tag threads with K_FP_REGS for FP state preservation.
- Update kernel configurations related to FPU usage.
- Apply the provided fix for FP ABI handling.
References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools
Here, you will find a curated list of external links that provide in-depth
information, practical solutions, and valuable tools related to
CVE-2026-11985.
| URL | Resource |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/3d405326a7653cba6860280e45c8734f8d3fc423 | |
| https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-qxr9-wh3c-hvgv |
CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration
While CVE identifies
specific instances of vulnerabilities, CWE categorizes the common flaws or
weaknesses that can lead to vulnerabilities. CVE-2026-11985 is
associated with the following CWEs:
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
(CAPEC)
stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the common attributes and
approaches employed by adversaries to exploit the CVE-2026-11985
weaknesses.
We scan GitHub repositories to detect new proof-of-concept exploits. Following list is a collection of public exploits and proof-of-concepts, which have been published on GitHub (sorted by the most recently updated).
Results are limited to the first 15 repositories due to potential performance issues.
The following list is the news that have been mention
CVE-2026-11985 vulnerability anywhere in the article.
The following table lists the changes that have been made to the
CVE-2026-11985 vulnerability over time.
Vulnerability history details can be useful for understanding the evolution of a vulnerability, and for identifying the most recent changes that may impact the vulnerability's severity, exploitability, or other characteristics.
-
New CVE Received by [email protected]
Aug. 11, 2026
Action Type Old Value New Value Added Affected [{'vendor': 'zephyrproject', 'product': 'zephyr', 'versions': [{'status': 'affected', 'version': '1.13.0', 'versionType': 'semver', 'lessThanOrEqual': '4.4.1'}], 'packageName': 'zephyr', 'programFiles': ['arch/Kconfig', 'arch/arm/core/Kconfig', 'arch/arm/core/cortex_a_r/thread.c', 'arch/arm/core/cortex_m/thread.c'], 'collectionURL': 'https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr', 'defaultStatus': 'unaffected'}] Added Description On the Zephyr ARM port, enabling the hardware FPU (CONFIG_FPU) forces the "Floating point ABI" choice, which defaults to CONFIG_FP_HARDABI. Both FP_HARDABI and FP_SOFTABI permit the compiler to emit hardware FP instructions in any function, even code that never uses floating-point types. However, the callee-saved FP registers (s16-s31 / d8-d15) are only saved and restored across a context switch when CONFIG_FPU_SHARING is enabled (arch/arm/core/cortex_m/swap_helper.S and arch/arm/core/cortex_a_r/swap_helper.S), and prior to this fix selecting an ABI did not enable FPU register sharing, which defaults off. In a build that enables the FPU with the default ABI but leaves CONFIG_FPU_SHARING disabled, the kernel preserves no callee-saved FP register state across thread switches. The documented precondition for this "unshared" mode — that only a single thread ever executes FP instructions — is silently violated because the compiler may generate FP instructions in every thread. Under CONFIG_USERSPACE, where threads are mutually isolated, this becomes an information-disclosure boundary crossing: a victim thread can leave secret-derived values in s16-s31, and a co-resident unprivileged thread can read those registers directly (FP register access is not privilege-gated), recovering data left behind by another thread. Without userspace the same defect causes cross-thread FP state corruption (a correctness fault). The leak is bounded to the 16 callee-saved single-precision registers and is opportunistic, so impact is low. The fix makes FP_HARDABI and FP_SOFTABI select CONFIG_FPU_SHARING and tags every thread with K_FP_REGS at creation, so callee-saved FP state is always preserved across context switches whenever the compiler may emit FP instructions. Added CVSS V3.1 AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N Added CWE CWE-200 Added Reference https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/3d405326a7653cba6860280e45c8734f8d3fc423 Added Reference https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-qxr9-wh3c-hvgv